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A myth about the origins of money has long organized modern approaches to the 
medium.  According to that creation story, money is the natural product of human 
exchange.  It can be analogized to a commodity like silver that comes to hand out of the 
decentralized activity of trading or a convention like language that arises out of a 
consensus about the value of an item.  But if we consider clues about money’s origins 
and extrapolate from its continuing practice, another story comes into focus.  It suggests 
that money is a constitutional project, a mode of governance for a material world.  Money 
is a means of mobilizing resources across a collective, one created when people advance 
in-kind value to a stakeholder in return for a unit that represents that advance.  The 
process both entails material value – the advance to the stakeholder is real – and converts 
it into a form that everyone else recognizes – the advance holds independent value 
because it offers a countable measure that can be transferred to make final payments. 
Money creation tied to a fiscal backbone can be expanded in response to the demand for 
cash:  that practice accords both with modern economic theory and the English medieval 
history that furnishes the setting here.  In contrast to the dominating myths about money, 
the “stakeholder” creation story explains how each of money’s functions is 
institutionalized and how that activity shapes “the market” that is made by money.    
  
Money has long starred in accounts of modernity and the way it arrived.  Many of 
those accounts converge to a surprising extent.  The reigning sources in history, law, and 
economics, written by those on the left and the right, by social theorists and neoclassical 
modelers, establish a basic narrative, a wide-ranging convention about money and the 
market it lubricates.   According to one of its greatest philosophers, Georg Simmel, 
money expresses in its complete neutrality “the economic relations between objects . . . in 
abstract quantitative terms, without itself entering into those relations.”  Karl Marx could 
have deployed the same formulation to capture the way money as a commodity, in fact 
the “universal equivalent” of all commodities, represents as commodities all objects in 
                                                 
1 This draft is the opening chapter of a longer history about the transformation in England 
from a monetary system based on commodity money to one based on bank-issued money.  
See Christine Desan, Making Money:  Coin, Bank Currency, and the Coming of 
Capitalism  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).   2 
exchange, veiling the social relations that inhere in their production.  Remarkably, the 
orthodoxy of modern macroeconomics echoes the philosopher and the arch-critic of 
capitalism.  “[A]lmost all economists agree,” according to one standard textbook, that 
“the money supply affects nominal variables – variables measured in terms of money – 
but not real variables” in the long run.  The “classical dichotomy” divides the world into 
real and monetary spheres; money is a signifier, a numeraire, an emphatically empty 
register of value.
2  
History, however, unsettles the modern imagination about money.  According to 
its practice, money is not a neutral instrument, one that expresses “the economic relations 
between objects . . . in abstract quantitative terms, without itself entering into those 
relations.”  To the contrary, money is a method of representing and moving resources 
within a collective, one that fixes or entails material value by identifying a marker with 
an obligation that individuals owe the group and can exchange among themselves.  The 
outcome is familiar.  Entailing value creates a unit that can measure other resources, pay 
off debts finally, and transfer value immediately. But that outcome is product of a process 
overlooked or, rather, ellipsed by the modern consensus.   When they take the steps that 
make money, communities intervene intimately into “the economic relations between 
objects” and the people who hold them.   That process lasts as long as money does; it 
includes the legal dynamics, the conceptual categories, the practical imperatives, the 
compliance and contestation that create the medium.  In short, money makes the market 
and fully enters into it. 
The case for a new approach to money and the market begins with an assessment 
of the conventions we now take to define that partnership.  “Money” and “market,” 
formal and real, play familiar and remarkably constant roles in the dominant narrative 
about how market-based modernity arrived.  According to that story, money arises 
immediately out of bipolar exchange; individuals converge upon that means to express 
the material value of objects.  The polarity of form and substance that is produced shapes 
both our history and the current realities we see.  That agreement is blunt and it falls apart 
                                                 
2 See Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money, 3rd enl. ed. (London: Routledge, 2004). 
125, 33; Karl Marx, Capital: a Critique of Political Economy, Pelican Marx Library 
(Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1976). 162; N. Gregory Mankiw, 
Macroeconomics, 4th ed. (New York: Worth Publishers, 2000). 238.    3 
immediately beyond the basic outline – but it is all the more powerful for the points of 
consensus that it appears to isolate.   
Against that consensus, an alternative creation story follows.   It draws on the 
history of money as it appeared in early England and as it unfolds in the book.  That 
history suggests that money is a constitutional (small “c”) project, a project just as rich 
and varied as other modes of governance.  Lke other modes of governance, money serves 
both public and private purposes.  It can be designed in ways that are democratic or 
dictatorial, stable or fagile.  It selects for certain exchange, sometimes sorting harshly by 
size and other times by parties or place.  It pervasively picks out certain objects as 
commodities and disallows that identity to others.   
“Money” is invented when a community, acting through a stakeholder, 
denominates in a homogeneous way the disparate contributions received from members, 
and recognizes them as a medium and mode of payment.  The group may be a state, but 
can also be a coalition much less grand, including a small polity, religious organization, 
or other union.  To produce money’s basic structure, participants advance the time value 
of resources owed to the center in return for that actor’s singular ability to represent those 
resources in units that are countable and transferable.  The units entail the material value 
of the taxed resources, as it is enhanced by the cash quality they gain as countable, 
transferable markers.  Both the fiscal value and cash premium of money are “real” values, 
not neutral properties.   Making money is therefore a material project:  it proceeds by 
intervening into the way people relate to resources and it distributes profits and costs as it 
does.  On the basis of money’s fiscal infrastructure and in response to people’s demand 
for cash services, societies can expand their money supplies beyond those made for 
public uses; they can sell money to individuals or license others to sell money to them.    
The practices that make money – the interventions that create a standard unit from 
disparate resources, that enforce it as a mode of payment, and that support it as it travels -
- construct exchange in that medium.   “The market” is thus integrally connected to 
“money.”   Recognizing that money and market take shape together reveals as well the 
drama that occurs as they change.   
   4 
A.  The Conventional Creation Story 
The standard narrative paints the coming of capitalism as a process, often long 
and gradual, that effectively merges with economic modernization.  A stain or a tide 
depending on whether the writer begrudges or approves it, capitalism begins with private 
property and priced exchange; it arrives when those practices penetrate territory that was 
formerly outside of “the market.”   
The basic story articulated by Adam Smith, or attributed to him in some version, 
springs to mind.  It centers on individuals inherently oriented towards truck and barter 
and the choices they make to improve their circumstances.  Those agents are liberated to 
specialize their labor when society recognizes rights of ownership in work and its results.  
Then, people can produce for exchange, procure through exchange, and generate 
increasing profits through exchange.  The market -- in Smith’s day, a physical place 
relatively free from the cloying restrictions of a mercantilist state -- becomes the 
paradigmatic promise of unfettered interaction in a liberal nation.
3   
Profoundly critical of that emancipatory story, Marx cast capitalism as its 
desperate alterity.  It was located in the immiseration of working man and the 
estrangement of his labor in its objectified product, in a process emptied of all 
gratification but the end result, and in the alienation of man and nature.  Private property 
here drove apart man from the creations of his hand and separated workers from owners.  
Priced exchange operated as the technology that obscured the relations of power that 
underlay the production of commodities.  But tying himself expressly to the classical 
political economists he savaged, Marx too crafted a narrative that wrote capitalism as a 
gathering force, or perhaps fate, that was cannibalizing social relations written on other 
logics.
4 
                                                 
3 See Adam Smith, The Essential Adam Smith  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
109-21, 67-90; Emma Rothschild, Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet, and 
the Enlightenment  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Discussion with 
author, Sept. 22, 2008, Cambridge, MA.  For versions of the Smithian story, see, e.g., R. 
A. Radford, "The Economic Organisation of a P.O.W. Camp," Economica 12, no. 48 
(1945); Douglass Cecil North, Structure and Change in Economic History, 1st ed. (New 
York: Norton, 1981). 
4 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844  (New York: International 
Publishers, 1964); Marx, Capital.   5 
Between and around these poles, accounts scatter in a hundred directions.   Across 
that profusion, however, several tropes emerge.  Early markets are read as bounded areas, 
fenced off both in ritual and in physical space.  Merchants operate as outsiders.  They 
represent a commercial logic at odds with the social bonds that tie communities together.  
But market actors and practice do not erode customary norms because they contribute 
only one element to the rich compound of human relation.
5   
That changes over time.  Economic production increases where growing 
populations create regimes of private ownership and move away from subsistence 
towards more extensive trade.  Cities replace smaller, more traditional communities.  
Between and within them, monetized exchange increasingly crowds out the reciprocal 
relations anchored in custom.  Networks of credit thicken until they extend beyond the 
merchant circles that generated them.
6  
At a certain point, markets overflow their bounds, they diffuse and penetrate 
everyday life, they move to the center.  As some scholars see it, expanding markets 
                                                 
5 For examples of historical and sociological approaches, see Jean-Christophe Agnew, 
Worlds Apart:  The Market and the Theater in Anglo-American Thought, 1550-1750  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 1-56; Arjun Appadurai, The Social Life 
of Tthings:  Commodities in Cultural Perspective  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986). [Intro]; Fernand Braudel, Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and 
Capitalism, Johns Hopkins symposia in comparative history (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1979);  Joyce Oldham Appleby, "Locke, Liberalism and the Natural 
Law of Money," Past and Present no. 71 (1976): 44; Joan Comaroff and John L.  
Comaroff, "Millenial Capitalism:  First Thoughts on a Second Coming," Public Culture 
12, no. 20 (2000).   For a review of the classic approach to medieval towns as economic 
spaces, see  Gerald E. Frug, City Making:  Building Communities without Building Walls  
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). 26-36.  For representations from 
economics, see Joseph M. Ostroy and Ross M. Starr, "Money and the Decentralization of 
Exchange," Econometrica 42, no. 6 (1974). 
6 See, e.g.,  Agnew, Worlds Apart: 52-56; Comaroff and Comaroff, "Millenial 
Capitalism," 331-34;  Joyce Oldham Appleby, Economic thought and ideology in 
seventeenth-century England  (Los Angeles: Figueroa Press, 2004). 23-24;  James A. 
Henretta, The Origins of American Capitalism: Collected Essays  (Boston: Northeastern 
University Press, 1991). [].  For reviews of the conventional approach to credit, see James 
Steven Rogers, The Early History of the Law of Bills and Notes: A Study of the Origins of 
Anglo-American Commercial Law, Cambridge Studies in English Legal History Index 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 1-4, and to modern banking, see Angela 
Redish, "Anchors Aweigh: The Transition from Commodity Money to Fiat Money in 
Western Economies," The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienne 
d'Economique 26, no. 4 (1993): 781-85.   6 
uproot the early modern English.  They are overwhelmed, unmoored, culturally upended 
in a world that allows the “fraternization of impossibilities” and an indiscriminate mix of 
men and commodities.
7  In the view of other scholars, the triumph of market organization 
frees the population from oppression, the conformist pressures that brake progress, and 
material want.  Participants are rational actors who finally secure protection again 
expropriation and busily begin building banks, trading securities, and making capital 
markets.
8   
In either case, economic exchange appears to have an almost uniform character 
and, indeed, authors find developments in similar measure across the Atlantic.  They cast 
the American eighteenth century as the story of men and women entering “the market,” 
assuming new roles as entrepreneurs, leaving independent farms for waged labor, and 
increasingly costing out the value of time in loans and leisure.  For some the process is 
natural, for others tragic, for still others celebratory.
9  Whether sadly or triumphantly, 
individuals enter the modern age, intimately but now impersonally tied to one another as 
producers, consumers, debtors, creditors, wage earners, and employers.    
                                                 
7 The quote is from  Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844: 169.  See, 
e.g., Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our 
Time, 2nd ed. (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2001); Agnew, Worlds Apart: 54/passim, chap 
1; Keith Hart, “On Commoditization,” in Esther N. Goody, From Craft to Industry:  The 
Ethnography of Proto-industrial Cloth Production  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982). 38-49;  Appleby, "Locke, Liberalism," 44; Deborah M. Valenze, The Social 
Life of Money in the English Past  (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2006)[]; Craig Muldrew, "Interpreting the Market: The Ethics of Credit and Community 
Relations in Early Modern England," Social History 18, no. 2 (1993).    
8 See, e.g., Douglass C. North and Barry R.  Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: 
The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," 
The Journal of Economic History XLIX, no. 4 (1989); Larry Neal, The Rise of Financial 
Capitalism: International Capital Markets in the Age of Reason, Studies in Monetary and 
Financial History (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Niall Ferguson, 
The Cash Nexus: Money and Power in the Modern World, 1700-2000  (New York: Basic 
Books, 2001).  
9 See, respectively, Winifred Barr Rothenberg, From Market-Places to a Market 
Economy: The Transformation of Rural Massachusetts, 1750-1850  (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1992);  Henretta, Origins of American Capitalism; Allan Kulikoff, The 
Agrarian Origins of American Capitalism  (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 
1992); Michael Merrill, "The Anticapitalist Origins of the United States," Fernand 
Braudel Review 13(1990); Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, 
1st Vintage Books ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1993).   7 
 The conventional story of economic modernization assigns money an essential 
role:  it is the instrumentality of the market.  Contemporary economists emphasize that 
money provides the liquidity that allows individuals to move beyond barter.  Money 
irrigates exchange by providing a fungible medium, one that obviates the need, if 
exchange is to occur, for a “double coincidence” of wants – the fortuity that people have 
commodities that they are willing to exchange at a time, quantity, and value that both 
agree on.  Further, a common currency allows goods to be valued over time relative to 
other goods, establishing prices that convey information about relative worth to buyers 
and sellers.  Finally, money acts as a store of value, an asset that carries purchasing 
power in liquid form.
10  It is, in fact, the evident functionality of money that renders it so 
dangerous, according to more critical observers.  For them, the ascendance of money 
effected categorical change because money in its very operation allowed everything to be 
measured, quantified, and understood as an object for exchange.  That representation 
veiled the reality instantiated in every commodity, its foundation in the contingent and 
increasingly coercive social relations defined by the mode of production.
 11 
Whether they consider it a blessing or a curse, commentators agree that money 
flows from custom or convention.  Many narratives stage its start in the wild simplicity of 
an early world.  In that conjured space, exchange was a murky broth of barter.  People 
                                                 
10 James Tobin, "Money," ed. Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume, 2d ed., The 
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (2008). 3-5; Ross Levine, "Financial 
Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda," Journal of Economic 
Literature 35, no. 2 (1997): 690-703. 
11 For Marx, money thus obscures the social relations that all products of man’s labor 
entail in their very creation.  Deceptively coded into exchange value, labor itself can 
come to appear an object for sale.  The relations of coercion, deprivation, and 
privatization that undergird it disappear into its commodification.  Labor, a generative 
force that exceeds the cost of its replenishment, is set against the objective appearance of 
other values; commodification both submerges and captures its creative capacity.  Marx, 
Capital.  For the rich analyses of money’s instrumentalizing aspects by scholars in 
sociology, history, and literary studies, see, e.g., Keith Hart, “On Commoditization,” 
1982, and the review by Valenze, Valenze, Social Life of Money: 23-25.  For the focus in 
sociology, see Viviana A. Rotman Zelizer, The social meaning of money  (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1997). 10-12; Geoffrey Ingham, "On the Underdevelopment 
of the 'Sociology of Money'," Acta Sociologica 41, no. 1 (1998).  In cognate fields, see 
Michel Callon, ed. The Laws of the Markets, Sociological review monograph (Oxford, 
UK: Blackwell Publishers/The Sociological Review, 1998); Marc Shell, The economy of 
literature  (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).   8 
traded all sorts of objects among themselves — grain, gold, cows and hides, promises, 
services, fish, and salt.  In the fluid mix of exchange, they found silver and gold 
especially easy to give and take.  Metal gradually rose like fat to the surface, becoming a 
favored medium and marker of value as it passed endlessly from hand to hand.  People 
cut silver and gold into pieces to make the process easier and more regular; disks of the 
commodity became coin.  Its brokers were buyers and sellers converging upon pieces of 
precious metal to mediate each transaction and, ultimately, to create prices in a common 
medium.
  
Content changes and the government assists as society becomes more complicated 
or bankers become more powerful -- but the medium has a constancy across all those 
details that is firmly rooted in the primal spring of exchange.  As Marx wrote, the 
“commodity form” into which the value of any other commodity can be translated may 
be made of any object.  Gold prevailed simply because, after serving as an equivalent for 
other commodities in isolated exchanges, “[g]radually it began to serve as universal 
equivalent in narrower or wider fields.”  It became the money form only after it “had won 
a monopoly of this position in the expression of value for the world of commodities.”
12   
Writing only a few years later, Carl Menger agreed on this, if nothing else.  An 
author of the marginalist revolution that came to revitalize classical approaches to 
economics, Menger understood money as the product of custom:  “As economizing 
individuals in social situations became increasingly aware of their economic interest, they 
everywhere attained the simple knowledge that surrendering less saleable commodities 
for others of greater salability brings them substantially closer to the attainment of their 
specific economic purposes.”   Continually trading less liquid for more liquid 
commodities that they would be able to use more easily to buy what they needed, 
individuals eventually create a medium of exchange:  “No one invented it,” concludes 
Menger, “money is a natural product of human economy.”
13   
                                                 
12 Marx, Capital: 163.  As Marx put it more generally, “The specific kind of commodity 
with whose natural form the equivalent form is socially interwoven now becomes the 
money commodity, or serves as money.” Ibid., 162. 
13 Carl Menger, Principles of Economics, trans. James Dingwall and Berthold Frank 
Hoselitz, The Institute for Humane Studies Series in Economic Theory (New York: New 
York University Press, 1981). 263.  An ocean away, in politics as well as society, another   9 
More recent writers reiterate the hypothesis.   Some do so with great 
sophistication, exploring the conditions under which we might find Mengerian 
convergence without centralized intervention.
14  Many assert the phenomenon much 
more simply.  One account of a World War II prisoner-of-war camp has become iconic.  
It offers a microcosm of the market or, as the author put it, a case study of a “brand new 
society” where observers can witness the “growth of economic institutions and customs.”  
And there, in the example of “an actual economy” clean of complexity, individuals 
naturally converged upon cigarettes – a random commodity that just happened to be 
commonly available -- as a medium of exchange.  The basic instrumentality of money 
occurred, that is, out of the decentralized activity of bargaining agents, without politics or 
collective orchestration.
15  
From its origin as an object chosen spontaneously by people making deals, money 
matures predictably, along with the market it supports.  Contemporary economics 
textbooks carry the bluntest version of the story.  They pick up where Marx and Menger 
left us, with people passing around the gold as a common denominator in exchange.  
After a while, the government “gets involved” to save people the costs, not to mention 
                                                                                                                                               
nineteenth historian produced a typical formulation of the phenomenon. “Currency,” he 
explained, “denotes whatever has been adopted, as a medium of exchange, by general 
consent and practice.” Joseph B. Felt, An Historical Account of Massachusetts Currency 
Microform  (1839). 10.  For classical liberal versions of the story, see David Hume, Of 
Money. 35-36; John Locke, "Further Considerations Concerning Raising the Value of 
Money," in John Locke:  Locke on Money (Oxford: Clarendon press, 1696), 410, 23.  
Some accounts acknowledge this history to be extrapolated as a matter of logic, not fact.  
See, e.g. Paul Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, Economics, 9th ed. (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1973). 274-76;  Kevin Dowd, "The Invisible Hand the the Evolution of the 
Monetary System," ed. John Smithin, What Is Money? (London: Routledge, 2000). .  
14 See, e.g., Robert A. Jones, "The Origin and Development of Media of Exchange," The 
Journal of Political Economy 84, no. 4 (1976) (reviewing literature and modeling 
phenomenon). 
15 Radford, "P.O.W. Camp," 160.  The Radford article has become a chestnut of 
introductory texts in macroeconomics, money, and finance.   See, e.g., Mankiw, 
Macroeconomics: 157; Frederic S. Mishkin, The economics of money, banking, and 
financial markets, 9th ed., The Addison-Wesley Series in economics (Boston: Addison-
Wesley, 2010). 55 n.1; Dowd, "The Invisible Hand the the Evolution of the Monetary 
System,"  143; Tobin, "Money,"  2; see also Donald W. Katzner, "Unity of Subject 
Matter in the Teaching of Intermediate Microeconomic Theory," The Journal of 
Economic Education 22, no. 2 (1991) (advocating use of the article in teaching basic 
economics).   10 
the headache, of measuring gold out, testing it, and trading it.  Coins of a standardized 
amount and fineness of metal enter circulation as units of account. 
16  
“Commodity money” – paradigmatically, money made from silver or gold – holds 
a preeminent place in the teleology of money.  If, in fact, individuals naturally converged 
upon a precious metal as the commodity equivalent of value and if the government steps 
in simply to facilitate their choice, then coin made of metal does indeed offer the 
prototype of money produced out of the autonomous acts of individuals, money can be 
analogized to bullion, and the government plays a distinctly inconsequential role.  In their 
most notable discussions of money, Hume and Ricardo equated it directly with silver and 
gold.
17  And in both popular and academic writing today, authors assume that the “Gold 
Standard” refers to a time when “gold” circulated outright as money, providing an anchor 
that stabilized the market.
18  Each formulation evokes money as a representative of value 
that is real, independent of politics, private, and impervious to tinkering. 
Macroeconomists make that identity explicit, modeling an “ideal commodity 
money” to exemplify the way a medium should work.  As they articulate it, an “ideal 
commodity money” creates a medium with stable value by tying prices for commodities 
in coin to prices for commodities in metal.
  Linking the stock of coin to the supply of a 
metal prevents the quantity of money from fluctuating independently of the market for 
that metal.  The technique should stop the price hikes that would occur if a sovereign 
anxious to spend more simply issued twice as many coins with half the amount of metal 
in each.  His ploy would obviously only work until people figured it out and started 
charging twice as much in the new coins.  But in the meantime, the ruler would make off 
                                                 
16 Mankiw, Macroeconomics: 158; see similarly Mishkin, Economics of Money: 57-59. 
17 David Ricardo, "On Foreign Trade," The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo 
I, no. Chapter 7 (1817 [2005)) (last accessed Dec. 21, 2012);  David Hume, “Of the 
Balance of Trade,” Political Discourses, 1752.  
18 See, e.g., Richard Lipsey, An Introduction to Positive Economics  (Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1975). 683-702; Tobin, "Money,"  3.   While Bordo later qualifies the image by 
noting the importance of fiduciary money, he explains the gold standard by equating it 
with circulating gold commodity money. Michael D. Bordo, The Gold Standard and 
Related Regimes: Collected Essays, Studies in Macroeconomic History (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999). 2-4.       11 
with an undeserved advantage and the arbitrary change in prices would disrupt the 
market.
19   
According to this view, a government can create an ideal commodity money 
system by identifying the metal content of each coin (for example, ounces of 
silver/penny), and converting metal to coin at the demand of users.   Coin is easier to use 
than raw metal, so people will often prefer to take it, selling their goods at a lower price 
in coined metal than they would demand in silver bullion.  Users will choose to have coin 
rather than silver whenever the value of coin exceeds the value of the silver in the coin – 
in other words, whenever prices in coin stay below the level they would be if stated in 
amounts of metal, given the amount of metal per coin.   When those prices are equal, the 
holder of coin can buy goods either at the “world price” of goods in silver (oz silver/gd), 
or at the price of goods in coin (oz silver/gd // oz silver/penny), which would come to the 
same thing.
20  
The “commodity money” system projected by the model creates a device that will 
equilibrate the amount of coin in circulation.  People will mint or melt coin depending on 
how much they value money’s services compared to the other things they might do with 
the metal that is in it, including paying or charging for other commodities.  When prices 
in coin rise above the level at which prices in coin and in metal are equal (i.e., the value 
of coin falls), users would rather have the silver in the coin, which they can use to buy 
more goods or for other purposes.  Coin will be melted for its silver content.  As coin 
leaves circulation, prices in coin will fall until coin and silver have the same relative 
                                                 
19 See, e.g., Redish, "Anchors Away," 785 & n.13.  If, for some reason, the sovereign 
wanted to have less coin, he could of course double the amount of metal content in each 
unit and prices would drop.  The effect would be the same as when stressed soldiers 
smoked their cigarette money and so took it out of circulation. 
20  “An ideal commodity money system is designed to equate the price level to a relative 
price of metal for consumption goods, and by making stocks of coins endogenous, to 
prevent effects on the price level coming from exogenous fluctuations in the quantities of 
coins.”  Thomas J. Sargent and Francois R. Velde, The Big Problem of Small Change, 
The Princeton Economic History of the Western World Indexes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2002). 11; see also ibid., 22. (“An ideal commodity money makes the 
price level proportional to [oz silver/gd – the world price in silver], where the factor of 
proportionality is… the number of coins of [a certain type] per ounce of silver.”); see also 
Angela Redish, Bimetallism: An Economic and Historical Analysis, Studies in 
Macroeconomic History Index (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 3.   12 
value.  Conversely, when prices in coin are below the point equal to the value-by-weight 
of coin, the value of coin will be higher than the metal it contains.  People will go to the 
mint to get coin.  That will raise the amount of coin in circulation, in turn raising prices in 
coin until they reach the point at which the value of coin equals the value-by-weight of 
coin  (in other words, the value of the metal in the coin).  Individuals, considering their 
advantage in matters of exchange, melt or mint in response.  They thus tie the total 
quantity of money and prices to the independent and shared supply of metal.
21 
The ideal commodity money model produced by modern macroeconomic theory 
is, itself, a kind of genesis story.  Its dynamism turns on individuals who can pay for 
goods in either silver or coin, and choose by comparing the world price of goods in silver 
to prices in coin.  Coin is effectively identified with the commodity; it is distinctive as 
money only insofar as it imports convenience, measuring and regularizing the 
commodity.  Value is determined by the exchange of real goods, traded according to the 
natural forces of supply and demand.  The decentralized and rational actions of 
participants produce an equilibrium – including a stock of money -- that is ultimately 
good for everyone.  There is no call for politics, as individuals need never collide with a 
concerted public.   Government is a freely available coordinating device, a technical 
service that costlessly provides the platform for individuated action.   The system is self-
calibrating, as opposed to centrally defined.  
It would be hard to imagine a more inanimate instrumentality than money, as 
captured by the ideal commodity model.  The sheer automaticity of the system, its 
depersonalized and depersonalizing effects, evokes a barebones agreement from Marx 
and others.  In Simmel’s words, it was the “uncompromising objectivity” of money that 
allowed it, at once solvent and dangerous, “technically perfect,” to render everything 
calculable.  Money was “colourless,” a matter “free from any quality and exclusively 
determined by quantity.”
 22  
If commodity money is the fulcrum of the system, it nonetheless begs revision.  
Money made of precious metals is heavy and hard to transport.  “Imagine the holes you’d 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., Sargent and Velde, Big Problem of Small Change: 9-12. 
22 Simmel, The Philosophy of Money: 127, 281, 367, 441, 44.   13 
wear in your pockets if you had to buy things only with coins!” notes one account.
23  
According to the prevailing common sense, banks start issuing paper notes that are claims 
to gold in reserve.  Their practice follows from long mercantile tradition of private credit. 
The government, again a secondary agent, eventually steps in to support a central bank as 
lender as last resort.  As long as people believe that the notes will be converted on 
demand, they are “just as valuable as the gold itself.”
24  The gold reserve is eventually 
abandoned as unnecessary because “[a]s long as everyone continues to accept the paper 
bills in exchange, they will have value and serve as money.”
25    
 As our representative textbook concludes, “Thus the system of commodity 
money evolves into a system of fiat money.”  As the author enjoins people to notice, in 
the end, “the use of money in exchange is largely a social convention.”  Everyone values 
fiat money “just because they expect everyone else to value it.”
26  To some observers, 
that quality makes money deeply problematic.  After all, insofar as money depends 
simply on “confidence,” money seems “one of the supreme fictions,” an illusion.  The 
money machine produces paper and fantasy; value is plotted on an axis that runs from 
“trust” to counterfeiting, and it is not clear that there is much difference between the two 
except the likelihood that someone will be able to pass on a bill in time to get substance 
for it.
27   Just as when it was made of gold, money remains an opaque instrument that 
obscures underlying allocations of power, now in a modern dress of paper.   
                                                 
23 Mishkin, Economics of Money: 57. 
24 Mankiw, Macroeconomics: 158.  On banks, see, e.g., Rondo Cameron, "England, 
1750-1844," in Banking in the Early Stages of Industrialization, ed. Rondo Cameron 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 1-2, 20-34; Walter Bagehot, Lombard 
Street, A Description of the Money Market  (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1873, 
1999). 
25 Mankiw, Macroeconomics: 158; Samuelson and Nordhaus, Economics: 274-76.  In 
most accounts, the government imports not only the capacity to lower transaction costs 
by making coin but also the danger that it will abusively skim off a profit by debasing 
coin.    
26  Mankiw, Macroeconomics: 158. 
27  Patrick Brantlinger, Fictions of State:  Culture and Credit in Britain, 1694-1994  
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). 24; see also, e.g., Alain Lipietz, The Enchanted 
World:  Inflation, Credit and the World Crisis, trans. Ian Patterson (London: Verso, 
1985). 78.   For the same view, written as farce, see http://www.theonion.com/articles/us-
economy-grinds-to-halt-as-nation-realizes-money,2912/.   14 
The point for us is that whether they applaud or condemn it, people agree on the 
basic trajectory of money’s development.  Convention has replaced the commodity 
content of coin while replicating its opacity.  Value is carried so intrinsically as a 
commodity or so diffusely as a social convention that power structures are either 
nonexistent (the neoclassical view) or elusive (the critical view).  First a commodity and 
then a convention suffice.   As James Tobin put it,  “The moneys chosen by societies 
have varied tremendously over human history.  So have their languages.  In each case, 
what is universal and important is that something is chosen, not what is chosen.”
28 
The end to the story is expedient, fashioned for a world that has gone off the Gold 
Standard.   Assuming that money is now “fiat,” considering it “chosen” as Tobin does, 
frees academics and policy makers up to address the monetary issues that appear 
pressing.  Those issues have overwhelmingly to do with the  controls on the government, 
supports for banks, monetary shocks, and the relationship between the quantity of money 
and the real economy.  That is true both for Keynesians and for those more classical in 
persuasion.  For some, the main issue of monetary policy is to “make fiat money operate 
as if it were a commodity money.”
29  For others, the money supply is only one 
determinant in the complex aggregate that comprises prices in the market for goods and 
services.
30  For still others, money is a policy tool to be deployed to encourage ideal 
levels of savings and investment.
31   Very few scholars, either from economics or 
otherwise, return to the question of what money is, how it is produced, and how that 
might matter.
32 
 
                                                 
28 Tobin, "Money,"  2.  Compare Ingham’s discussion of Talcott Parsons’ approach to 
money as a language, i.e., another “medium of exchange.”  Ingham, 
"Underdevelopment," 5-6. 
29 L. Randall Wray, "Alternative Approaches to Money," Theoretical Inquiries in Law 
11, no. 1 (2010): 33 (critiquing view).  As Alan Greenspan testified to his apparent 
success shortly before leaving office, those central banks most importantly determining 
monetary policy had operated  “’as if’ the nations were on a commodity (gold) money 
standard.”  Alan Greenspan, "Monetary Policy Report To Congress," (2005).  See, e.g., 
Lipietz, The Enchanted World; Milton Friedman, The Optimum Quantity of Money: and 
Other Essays  (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969). 
30 Tobin, "Money,"  . 
31 Charles I. Jones, Introduction to Economic Growth  (New York: Norton, 1998). 
32 For exceptions, see those working in Neil Wallace’s fundamental models of money 
school, e.g., N. Wallace, "Whither Monetary Economics," International Economic   15 
Across its varied retellings, the creation story writes the market into a certain 
relationship with money.  That structure emerges all the more powerfully because it is 
common to such otherwise disparate accounts.  It becomes, in its reiteration, a truism of 
modern thought.  In that status, it evades analysis to a striking extent.  
On one hand, the market and money are highly identified with each other.  
Histories of the market move back and forth between that topic and accounts of money’s 
extension, as if they were proxies for each other, or as if the market were a matter of 
degree marked by money.  Other accounts are more specific.  As Karl Polanyi described 
the epoch of the market economy:  
The transformation implies a change in the motive of action on the part of the 
members of society:  for the motive of subsistence that of gain must be 
substituted.  All transactions are turned into money transactions, and these in turn 
require that a medium of exchange be introduced into every articulation of 
industrial life.
33 
 
On the other hand, the market and money each play a very particular part in the 
drama they present.  Simply put, the market is the end and money is the means; the first is 
substance, the second is form.  Those roles neatly reinforce the larger argument that 
markets are basically synonymous with modernization.  For a great number of scholars, 
the market is the partner that matters.  Here are the “real economy” and “economic 
fundamentals” that the discipline of economics seeks, the material advance in quality of 
                                                                                                                                               
Review (2001); Angela Redish and Warren E. Weber, "A Model of Commodity Money 
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monetary theory.  E.g.,Randall Wray, "Modern Money," in What Is Money?, ed. John 
Smithin (New York: Routledge, 2000); L. Randall Wray, Understanding Modern Money: 
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Re-Theorizing Liquidity (Cambridge, MA2011); Steve A.  Marglin, Raising Keynes:  A 
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the Fed Became the Dealer of Last Resort  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
2011); Morgan Ricks, "Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis," Harvard Business 
Law Review 1(2011); Roy Kreitner, "The Jurisprudence of Global Money," Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law 11(2010); Redish, Bimetallism.  
33 Polanyi, Great Transformation: 44; see also, e.g., Rondo E. Cameron et al., Banking in 
the Early Stages of Industrialization; a Study in Comparative Economic History  (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1967). 1.   16 
life that liberalism claims, and the brutal reality of dispossession and exploitation that 
Marxist and post-colonial studies locate at the base of capitalism.  As Schumpeter 
described the goal of orthodox economics, “Real analysis proceeds from the principle 
that all the essential phenomena of economic life are capable of being described in terms 
of good and services, of decisions about them, and of relations between them.”
34  Trade 
in things you can “buy, sell, and drop on your foot” is the productive heart of the 
economy – and the essential object of its discipline, economics.
35 
That view informs other disciplines at a basic level.  Consider the prize-winning 
appeal of the Gordon Wood’s approach to the American Revolution.  It was “radical,” 
argues Wood, in its capacity to find “new democratic adhesives in the actual behavior of 
plain ordinary people – in the everyday desire for the freedom to make money and pursue 
happiness in the here and now.”  This tale of uplift makes material striving the generative 
force of American politics and culture:  Wood describes the development as one located 
in the “commonplace behavior of ordinary people” that made Americans “almost 
overnight, the most liberal, the most democratic, the most commercially minded, and the 
most modern people in the world.” (Wood adds “capitalistic” in the next paragraph.)
36 
Even the critics of liberalism accept the category.  The commodification of work 
and other areas of social life, the relentless maw of accumulation, the ever-increasing 
                                                 
34 Joseph Alois Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis  (New York: Oxford 
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35 Mark Blyth, Great Transformations:  Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the 
Twentieth Century  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); for comment, see 
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Modern Finance: The Case of Long Term Capital Management," Journal of Portfolio 
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Revolution: the First Generation of Americans  (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2000); Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America; an 
Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution, 1st ed. (New York: 
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Politics Shaped American Independence  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).     17 
industry of production, the impersonality of capitalist competition – these were the primal 
forces that originally animated the fatal misappropriation of power at the heart of 
capitalism.  Thus “market” exchange does battle with exchange organized around logics 
that are feudal, communal, traditional, religious, or local.   Ideology, culture, psychology, 
and categories of thought take an increasingly important place in modern scholarship.  
But they are often deployed to understand a mentalite or social practice that is “market” 
or not, economistic or not.
37    
If the market is “real” economic activity, then money is its “formal” partner.  That 
does not mean that money is unimportant; it is as essential as the function it performs. 
Only when a medium exists, value can be measured, and assets can be stored in liquid 
form can individuals specialize as owners, producers, or workers, set or receive wages, 
calculate risks and profits; only then can “the market” penetrate time and space in the 
way that the standard narrative identifies as distinctive to modernity.   Money’s functions 
– its capacity as a medium of exchange, unit of account, and store of value – furnish the 
definition of money.  Indeed, that trinity becomes the shorthand for money in most 
accounts.
38  As Geoffrey Ingham put it, “money is what money does.”
39 
If money is a purely instrumental entity, then it enables but does not affect the 
substance of trades.  The classical image of the economy follows: 
[The idealized economy is] a frictionless, costless system of multilateral barter, in 
which relative prices and the allocations of labour and capital among various 
productive activities are determined in competitive markets.  [The] proposition is 
that the outcomes of an economy with money are the same as those that would 
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arise from their ideal barter model.  The corollary is that real economic outcomes 
are independent of the particular nature of the monetary institutions.
40 
 
If money’s character is purely expressive, it amounts to information.  Given the ability to 
capture value that money represents, agents can make contracts for future commodity 
sales and can adjust for contingencies by setting conditional terms – Arrow-Debreu 
contracts.  That capacity confirms the possibility that there is a general equilibrium at 
which the aggregate demand for every good meets aggregate supply for that good.
41  
  Keynes would most famously attack at this point based on the stubborn reality 
that, whatever the postulates of classical theory, people attribute substantive value to 
having the liquidity provided by money.  They insist on holding certain amounts of it as a 
store of value, despite the fact that they should be able to arrange for contingencies 
without immobilizing an amount of money.  That allocation of resources introduces 
imperfections into the market for goods and services.  Aggregate demand may fail to 
meet aggregate supply.
42 
Despite the revolutionary impact of Keynes’s theory on economics and its 
continued influence at the academic level, in policy-making, and in popular thought, 
belief in the “classical dichotomy” remains dominant.  A commitment to the notion that 
the market is “real” and money is neutral agent, at least in the long-run, controls in the 
basic economics text and shapes economic decision-making.
43  The strength of that 
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paradigm, or deference to the Keynesian assault, suppresses significant challenge from 
other disciplines.
44  In unwitting consonance, the obvious recourse for those critical 
scholars who understand money as a “veil,” a con, and chimera is to lift it aside, to get 
beyond it, and to see through it.  Their inclination, in other words, is to find somewhere 
else the actual workings of the modernity and the power relations that animate it.
45  We 
are back to “the market” as the site of the real.   
Note how the binary that casts the market-as-real and money-as-information (or 
alternatively, money-as-illusion) draws from the creation story written for money.  
Money stems from convention, and convention is immaterial, “costless,”  or “colourless.”  
It is the result of decentralized activity as opposed to a collective project.  While the latter 
would, by its organization of participants, define value in a way that has materiality, the 
former defines value only as knowledge; information (or illusion) is free.    
The “market” and “money,” defined as they are by the conventional creation 
story, reinforce each other because of the way they channel our attention; the overall 
effect is to give the modernization narrative great durability.  The formal partner of the 
money-market dichotomy does not repay analysis because it is a function or a signifier 
                                                                                                                                               
Modern Finance,".  The profuse “securitization” of the 1990s and early 2000s was 
conceived as a way of diversifying risk and so reducing it, thus making an ever more 
abundant and inexpensive credit available to borrowers.  For that view and the response 
that securitization in fact engendered more risk, see Anastasia Nesvetailova, "The Crisis 
of Invented Money:  Liquidity Illusion and the Global Credit Meltdown," Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law 11, no. 1 (2010); Krugman, NYT, 3/27/09; Hyman P. Minsky, ""The 
Financial Instability Hypothesis"," Working Paper No. 74 (1992). 
44 Geoffrey Ingham portrays sociology’s aversion to analyzing money as part of a 
disciplinary settlement between it and economics; William Reddy emphasizes the 
Whiggish tilt of historians who incorporated the facilitative capacity of money as part of 
the meta-narrative of Western progress. Ingham, "Underdevelopment,"; William M. 
Reddy, Money and Liberty in Modern Europe:  A Critique of Historical Understanding  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 34-46.   That default is basically 
complete where the economic aspects of money are concerned, although scholars like 
Viviana Zelizer consider social uses and interpretations of money.   Ingham, 
"Underdevelopment," 3; see, e.g., Zelizer, Social Meaning; Valenze, Social Life of 
Money.  
45 In striking confirmation that their approaches approach money in a common way, both 
orthodox neoclassical economists and their critics describe it as a “veil.”  See Ingham, 
"Underdevelopment," 4-5, 6-7;  compare Robertson, Money  (Chicago: University of 
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only -- merely a means to the market’s end.  But while it appears empty or technical, 
“money” packages a controversial view of human nature and society.  Money’s very 
existence – if it came about in bipolar exchange between enterprising agents, each 
calculating his or her own interest -- becomes evidence of that activity as the root of 
economic life and its logic.    
The real partner, the market, relies on that deep coding to gain definition as 
authentic and undeniable.  Once we have agreed on the character of money, the activity 
conducted by money – exchange by enterprising individuals -- is confirmed as primal and 
productive.  The message is that the market is at once basic, as basic as its partner, and 
the site of literal materiality, a materiality that its monetary partner facilitates, transmits, 
or effectuates, for better or worse.   
The money-market intuition gains resilience because it is built into the very 
vocabulary of the conventional creation story and produced in the practices that story 
promotes.  That is a vocabulary of agency either poured into things or captured in 
conventions.  It is a story of people either liberated or unmoored.  It is an approach that 
understands “the social” as the pattern of their choices or as the fragile space opposed to 
their atomism.  In this world, the political economy pitches between promoting energy 
and productivity on the one hand, and protecting the public welfare, social meaning, and 
cultures (popular, indigenous, local, etc.) on the other – as if these were discrete values 
and it were a matter of striking a balance.  The debate turns on whether “the market” may 
need regulation, and whether the reach of money may need restraint.  Indeed, in many 
ways, the narrative of modernization – as a story of the market and money -- operates in 
terms of innate dichotomies that are entrenched even as they are qualified or resisted.   
Taken together, these dynamics go a long way to reify the contemporary political 
economy so that it is found, like money itself. 
 
B.  Money as a Constitutional Project 
We can imagine conditions that would make the “convergence” story possible. 
We assume exchange with enough momentum to generate the medium supposed itself to 
generate exchange.  We assume as well the background terms that would make that initial 
exchange possible.  There must be notions of property that identify objects with   21 
individuals, modes of contract or agreement that allow transactions, and enough 
enforcement to protect those claims of ownership and transfer, all these despite the 
absence of authorities acting with a medium to pay for such governance work.  We 
assume that, given those hypothesized safeguards, people making a subsistence living in 
a pre-monetary era set aside an item durable enough to last the amount of time it takes in 
a barter economy to find a trading partner.  (Silver appears again and again as money, 
although it is expensive, inedible, of little practical use, and unworkable by untrained 
hands.)  In fact, we assume that people safely hold, indeed accumulate, some material 
like metal in raw form on the prediction that other people will want it, before it has 
emerged as a medium.  We assume that, in an unspecialized world, countable units with 
enough uniformity, authenticity, and transparency to convey value in countable form 
appear with enough frequency before money to take office as money.
46  We assume, 
finally, that once money appears, it stays in circulation by some sort of network effect, 
insulated from big men who would break the consensus by cornering the medium, 
marauders who would steal it, and fickle individuals who would renege in their desire for 
it.   
In other words, the area of “assuming” required to make the convergence story is 
enormous.  As the following chapters argue, the convergence story is also in tension with 
the history of money we have.  It is even more surely inconsistent with the practice of 
money today, a matter of paper, balance sheets, and central banks.  
Alternatively, we could look for a creation story that explains how money 
emerges without assuming the exchange it is supposed to enable.  Money has arisen again 
and again, in many places and periods; it must start from a source more robust than a 
scaffold of assumptions.  In fact, a creation story should go beyond money’s initial 
appearance, it should also makes sense of money’s continued operation.   The practice of 
money daily re-enacts the beginning (and end) of money, as it maintains the flow of 
money in (and out) of circulation.  We need a story that acknowledges, even draws upon, 
money’s constant construction.  Finally, a creation story should illuminate the connection 
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between the way money works and the exchange it enables, including the objects labeled 
commodities by their sale.  The relationship between money and the market should be 
explored, rather than postulated.  
 
Conceptualizing Money Creation  
 If we consider clues about money’s origins and extrapolate from its continuing 
practice, another story comes into focus.  It suggests that money is a constitutional 
project, a mode of governance for a material world.  Money is a means of mobilizing 
resources across a collective, one created when people advance in-kind value to a 
stakeholder in return for a unit that represents that advance.  The process both entails 
material value – the advance to the stakeholder is real – and converts it into a form that 
everyone else recognizes – the advance holds independent value because it offers a 
countable measure that can be transferred to make final payments.  That character of 
money enables new activity.  Rather than emerging from trade, money instead creates the 
trades it facilitates.  Put more accurately, rather than a generic (money) produced by a 
generic (exchange), money appears as a particular initiative that creates exchanges of 
particular kinds.  Money can be conceptualized as a process that organizes a group and 
redirects individuals, even as those agents make and remake money.  Nothing about the 
phenomenon leads obviously to capitalism, or in any other direction.  Rather, as people 
pioneered different kinds of money, they created different kinds of markets.    
If we take the beginning of money seriously, we arrive in a place that is 
dramatically drier than the broth of barter that modern commentators might imagine.  
There is no “unit of account” or shared means of measuring.  There is no universal mode 
of settling accounts and no common medium.  There is no activity that produces price, 
whether in grain or barley, or the shadow liquidity of silver.  People may exchange items, 
but “barter” is likely far from the triangle of swaps – a cow for ten chickens, ten chickens 
for the pot desired at the outset – that later commentators often impute to it.  However 
people transfer goods and services between themselves depends not only on how they   23 
value those things, but on what practices of claiming, using, giving, and taking goods and 
other resources exist.
47  
The early English experience offers a setting with some similarities.  According to 
historians of early money, the use of money broke down in Britain after the Roman army 
left and administrative connections ended.  The imperial economy had been highly 
monetized; spending and taxing in coin spread it throughout the territories, while Roman 
law supported money’s use in private exchange.
48  When the fiscal pump failed and 
authorities withdrew, the money once pushed into circulation stopped flowing to the 
island.  According to Peter Spufford, “within a generation, by about A.D. 435, coin 
ceased to be used there as a medium of exchange . . . although many survived as jewelry, 
or were used for gifts or for compensation.”
49   
More recent accounts, informed by archaeological advances, qualify that 
conclusion.  They suggest that some coins still arrived, although in small numbers, from 
the Continent, where their use as money continued to some extent.  Some communities 
may also have kept using Roman-era silver coinage for some time to compensate those 
defending their settlements; samples from 5
th century hoards in Britain are clipped in 
ways that may suggest they were recycled in systematic ways.  Hoards have also 
produced low-value bronze Roman tokens that could have circulated after their issue, if 
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only in some locales.  Scholars argue as well that coin found refashioned into ornaments 
may have had a previous use in exchange.
50 
But even the revolution in numismatic evidence that has occurred since the 1970s 
with the advent of metal detecting and the increase in coin finds has not rewritten the 
bottom line.
51  Gareth Williams, one of the scholars most sensitive to the possibility of 
monetary continuity, concludes that the evidence “suggests an attempt to prop up a 
failing system for as long as possible, in the absence of a proper coinage supply from 
central government.”  The view that “there was a complete break in the coinage system is 
hard to challenge.”
52   Most recent contributions to the debate agree:  from sometime after 
410 until about 610, there was little coin circulating as money in England.   As Rory 
Naismith puts it, “minting and coin-use in Britain had to be rebuilt from the ground up.”
53  
                                                 
50 On imported coin and residual Roman coin, see Williams, "Coinage in Conversion-
Period England," 151, 53-54, 59-63; Richard Abdy, "After Patching:  Imported and 
Recycled Coinage in Fifth- and Sixth-Century Britain," in Coinage and History in the 
North Sea World, c. AD 500-1250, ed. Barrie Cook and Gareth Williams (Leiden, the 
Netherlands: Koninklijki Brill NV, 2006), 83-88, 91-95.  Abdy cautions that the 
importations appear occasional and “not for any systematic purpose.”  According to a 
recent review of the archaeological evidence, light imports circulated through the lowland 
areas of England in the 6
th and 7
th centuries, but more significant imports were common 
only in Kent.  Chris Wickham, Framing the Early Middle Ages:  Europe and the 
Mediterranean, 400-800  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 808-09.  On bronze 
Roman coin, see also Kenneth Dark, Britain and the End of the Roman Empire  (Stroud, 
2000), who argues more strongly for its continued use, and T.S.N. Moorhead, who 
contests that view.  T. S. N.  Moorhead, "Roman Bronze Coinage in Sub-Roman and 
Early Anglo-Saxon England," in Coinage and History in the North Sea World, c. AD 
500-1250, ed. Barrie Cook and Gareth Williams (Leiden, the Netherlands: Koninklijke 
Brill NV, 2006); see also Esmonde Cleary, Ending: 140.  On re-used coin, see Williams, 
"Coinage in Conversion-Period England," 161-69. 
51 Individual coin “finds” offer clues to coin use different from those found in burial sites 
or hoards.  The latter represent coin dedicated to ritual use or laid aside from circulation 
while coin finds plausibly reflect coin lost in use.  Williams, "Coinage in Conversion-
Period England," 151-52.  
52 Ibid., 158.. 
53 As Naismith continues “. . . just like many other aspects of government.”   Naismith, 
Money and Power: 15; Anna Gannon, The Iconography of Early Anglo-Saxon Coinage  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 7-8; see also Abdy, "After Patching," 94-95 
(arguing that transition to “a bullion-using society where coins (so long as they were of 
precious metal) were incidental” had occurred by 470 in England).   25 
The vacuum left by coin’s demise was not substantially filled, as far as the record 
reflects, with another medium.
54  In the wake of the imperial retreat, writes Chris 
Wickham, “exchange structures collapsed everywhere.”  The material break with the 
earlier world that occurred in the 5
th century was dramatic.  The sheer drop in “the 
sophistication of material culture,” Wickham notes, “might seem too total to be credible” 
but for the very wide base of evidence supporting it.  Pottery and other industries 
disappear.  Roman sites are reappropriated for structures so simple as to resemble Iron-
Age dwellings.  Written sources vanish; conversely, Gallic sources rarely mention 
England.
55  The layer of “dark earth” that covers some Roman towns is especially 
evocative of collapse.  Once assumed to come from the decayed material of those 
settlements, it is now considered to represent the turn to organic building material by later 
inhabitants.
56  While scholars debate how to interpret the “dramatic material collapse” of 
5
th century England, they widely agree that it occurred.
57   
The conditions in England after the departure of Roman forces suggest the terrain 
on which we should look for money’s creation.  For individuals, the circumstances 
sharply circumscribed trading.  Production of wares moved to the household:  ceramics 
were hand-made there; clothing was woven family by family.  Households surely dealt 
with one another but distance and the difficulties of travel, scantiness of communication, 
and lack of information made barter unwieldy.  Commercial demand was virtually non-
                                                 
54 Cf., Naismith, Money and Power: 290; see also note __, supra, re residual coin use in 
5
th and 6
th centuries.  Christopher Loveluck notes evidence of trade with continental 
Europe at Flixborough, England prior to the late 7
th century, but no findings of coin or 
other media of exchange.  Christopher Loveluck, Keith Dobney, and James Barrett, 
"Trade and Exchange -- The Settlement and the Wider World," in Rural Settlement, 
Lifestyles and Social Change in the Later First Millenium AD:  Anglo-Saxon Flxborough 
in its Wider Context, Excavations at Flixborough (Oxford, UK: Oxbow Books, 2007), 
112-13. 
55 Wickham, The Early Middle Ages: 338, 06, 08-09.  
56 See Esmonde Cleary, Ending: 147-48; Richard I Macphail, Henri Galinie, and Frans 
Verhaeghe, Antiquities 77, no. 296 . 
57 Wickham, The Early Middle Ages: 308.  See, e.g,   Naismith, Money and Power: 15; 
Williams, "Coinage in Conversion-Period England," 158-59; Esmonde Cleary, Ending: 
131; R.  Reece, "Models of Continuity," Oxford Journal of Archaeology 8, no. 2 (1989).  
Kenneth Dark reviews the debate and argues for a more developed Romano-Christian 
culture that survived in Britain until the 7
th century.  See  Dark, Britain and the End of the 
Roman Empire: 10-26.   26 
existent; there is no evidence of exchange networks of any extent until the late 7
th 
century.  “All forms of market exchange, beyond the simplest,” Wickham concludes, 
“must have ceased.”
58  It is difficult to conceive that a metal, hard to work and 
impractical for everyday use beyond the aesthetic, would begin to circulate as money 
because people had incrementally or spontaneously converged on its use.  
But individuals were not the only actors in England.  Communities operated 
continuously.  As in other worlds, people formed bonds for social life, mutual protection, 
and shared production.  Wickham describes early Anglo-Saxon societies as groups made 
up of peasants who were self-supporting economically, brought together by ties of 
“mutual obligation and loyalty,” often with family connections.  People maintained their 
stakes in the group with regular contributions.  Rulers, often on the order of small chiefs, 
took tribute in food, labor, and “above all, army service.”
59    They obviously offer only 
one example of communal organization and varied even across Britain.  Groups 
elsewhere and in other periods could organize around kings or counsels, more structured 
governing bodies, or representative institutions.    We could call those leaders, taken 
generally, “stakeholders” to capture the variety of ways they anchored groups without 
implying that “states” engineer every collective activity or act of governing.    
Transferring goods between individuals, the agents in the convergence story, is 
hard enough in a society that is truly illiquid.  But individuals can get by in subsistence 
production, making one-off exchanges, or with idiosyncratic arrangements between 
reciprocating partners.  Mobilizing the material resources and labor of a group is far more 
difficult.  The goal may be defending a territory or taking more of it, clearing and 
cultivating common space, or policing, educating, or caring for people.  In early England, 
the construction of defensive fortifications and bridges were especially common.
60 
                                                 
58 The number of looms found in England far exceeds those recovered from Gaulish 
settlements, indicating that each home did its own weaving.  Wickham, The Early Middle 
Ages: 809, 307.  As Wickham puts it, what was “recession” in Gaul, reversed after AD 
500, turned into “catastrophe” in Britain.  Ibid., 307..   
59 Ibid., 305, 15, 20-21..  Feudal dependencies were a later development.   
60 Ibid., 315..  The same tasks are emphasized in the later Anglo-Saxon period.  See V 
Aethelred, sec. 1 (1008), as reprinted in Appendix, Ellen Screen, "Anglo-Saxon Law and 
Numismatics:  A Reassessment in the Light of Patrick Wormald's The Making of English 
Law," British Numismatics Journal 77(2007): 169.   27 
Whatever the goal and whoever the instigator, a collective enterprise is an enormous 
challenge in a landscape without liquidity.  It requires more than aggregating 
contributions; it requires collecting and coordinating, evaluating, protecting, preserving, 
and redistributing them.   
Like many other communities, those that emerged in 5
th and 6
th century England 
relied heavily on labor drafted from participants and tribute taken in-kind.  Charters from 
the following centuries suggest that kings accepted honey, bread, “ambers” of ale, 
livestock, cheese, butter, and fish.
61  Those contributions informed their power and the 
structure of their rule.  The early Anglo-Saxon leaders had a practice, for example, of 
circulating through their territories, a habit that may have been driven by their need to 
gather support in-kind.
62  That technique, however, must have run into limits given the 
finite resources of hosting families, and may help explain the small size of many political 
communities.   Larger collective projects -- Offa’s dyke, a defensive fortification of the 
8
th century offers one example –would have required a more orchestrated approach; the 
dyke may have been constructed with labor impressed proportionately across the Mercian 
territory.
63  Communal undertakings could be orchestrated in other ways – feudal 
relationships and reciprocal work efforts.  But an alternative that appears regularly, across 
different communities and in very different forms, is making money. 
Making money, a phenomenon almost impossible to explain if we limit our field 
of vision to individuated exchange, becomes easily comprehensible once we enlarge that 
lens to include the collective activity that links individuals and communities.  
Stakeholders in the early world, those organizing a group and its resources, had particular 
need for a medium – but as actors with a unique relationship to those around them, they 
also had the unmatched capacity to create it.  In fact, making money was likely easier, in 
many ways, that many alternative ways of organizing resources.  Money is a way to mark 
and mobilize material value that can start at the center, work selectively and with limited 
information, and yet enlist the contributions of a broad group.  Contrary to our intuitions, 
                                                 
61 Wickham, The Early Middle Ages: 321. 
62 See D. M. Metcalf, Thrymsas and Sceattas in the Ashmolean Museum Oxford, 3 vols., 
vol. 1 (London: Royal Numismatic Society and Ashmolean Museum, 1993). 12-13; 
Naismith, Money and Power: 29-30. 
63 David Hill, "The Construction of Offa's Dyke," The Antiquaries Journal 65(1985).   28 
making money requires less political prowess or bureaucratic capacity than orchestrating 
an initiative by eliciting and redirecting resources, in-kind, from all participants.   
Money is created when a stakeholder uses his or her singular location at the hub 
of a community to mark the disparate contributions of individuals in a common way. The 
moment occurs when the stakeholder takes contributions from people before they are due 
and gives out uniform receipts in return, each a token intended to document the early 
contribution.  That token, turned in later at a time of reckoning, operates to convert goods 
and services that are not otherwise fungible – the variety of contributions due to the 
center -- into matters counted in a standard unit.   The initiative requires only one more 
twist to make money fully operational:  if the stakeholder recognizes the receipt and takes 
it from anyone’s hand as an item that exonerates the person holding it from making a 
contribution otherwise due, the receipt can travel from hand-to-hand and maintain its 
worth as an item that pays off the center.   The result is a token that fixes or entails value 
in a way that both the stakeholder and individuals can use, a novel accomplishment in a 
world without an agreed-upon way to measure and transfer resources.  
An example makes the strategy more concrete.  A small Anglo-Saxon ruler of the 
early 7
th century may have taken goods and labor regularly from a thousand families on 
rounds of the territory they all inhabited.   Facing a threat from another community, 
however, he might at one point draft extraordinary services and supplies from a hundred 
of them, rewarding them with tokens to recognize that their contributions had been 
double that ordinarily due and promising to take back the tokens in the future, each one in 
lieu of the next quota of tribute.   The families could set aside the tokens, satisfied to 
know that they had satisfied an obligation in advance.  Or, willing to resume giving 
tribute to their chief on the next round, they could pass their tokens on to another person 
or family – there may be many takers willing to give real value (good, labor, loyalty, etc.) 
for a token.  Those new families may prefer giving resources now to paying tribute later; 
they will set their token aside to give the ruler when their quota is due.  Or they may 
make the exchange because they anticipate that they can use the token in another trade.   
Never before could they depend upon having an item to which virtually everyone else in 
the community would attribute real value.  Now, every person has reason to look to the   29 
tokens as a meaningful measure, store of (real) value, and mode of payment that can 
change hands.   
Unpacking the example illustrates the way money functions for both the 
stakeholder and participants.  First, the strategy provides the community, acting in the 
figure of its ruler, an effective way to mobilize goods and services because the token 
entails real value.  Each token awarded by the stakeholder represents actual resources that 
have been given to the center.  Each token has, in that sense, a material referent:  the 
token was given to mark an amount of goods or labor contributed and it will, according to 
the terms of the system set out above, exonerate someone later from a contribution of the 
same dimension.
64  A successfully working money thus carries or fixes material value 
within each token, whether that money is made of silver or paper, whether it takes a 
commodity or a “fiat” form.  In fact, the material referent of a token will be made “real” 
in physical terms if need be.  If those owing contribution to a stakeholder do not pay with 
a token, they will make their usual contribution in-kind.  Later systems may be more 
completely monetized, so that revenue is expected in cash.  But if a debtor to the system 
does not pay, an authority will confiscate other goods – houses, capital, or earnings – to 
make good the obligation.   The obligations that support a money can take many forms --  
tribute, rents, fees, tithes, or penalties.  But given that taxes most powerfully anchor 
modern monetary regimes, we can appropriately call the material referent of a token its 
“fiscal value.”  
Entailing value in a token allows a stakeholder to command resources with great 
effect.   The stakeholder can “buy” what it needs when it needs them, paying in receipts 
that it takes back later.  In effect, the stakeholder gains the capacity to spend and tax in 
money as it makes money.  The stakeholder can spend heavily on one good, labor or 
military service, while taxing or taking tribute widely.  The soldiers or suppliers earning 
extra tokens in the example above would have reason to trade them to others for goods or 
services.  Those others, owing tribute, tax, fees, or other contributions to the center, 
would sell the soldiers and suppliers up to the same amount of material they otherwise 
owe the center.   The tokens would enter the community when the stakeholder paid for 
                                                 
64  For fine-tuning of the contribution’s size, which might be lightened in return for its 
being given in advance,  see infra note __      30 
particular goods, radiate through the group as they circulated, and then return as people 
offered them in instead of other, in-kind contributions.  Although he dealt with only a 
narrow group of suppliers, the stakeholder would thus draw on a broad catchment of 
contributions.    
Depending on how the strategy was managed, it could move the community 
towards highly monetized dealings:  as the stakeholder  “spent” heavily at the outset, it 
would take in more tokens and less tribute of other kinds at the time of reckoning.   
Eventually, a community could run its public affairs purely by taxing and spending.  On 
the other hand, the strategy could also be a limited initiative, one that reached only 
certain circles of people.  For example, a ruler might pay for certain supplies in tokens, 
which could come to travel in near proximity to those sellers – merchants, for example, in 
towns.  At the same time, the contribution of peasants could be maintained in-kind or 
labor.  Monetary initiatives that were partial or selective in this sense would help produce 
the dichotomized payment patterns that appear in many societies.
65  The point here is that 
a stakeholder greatly expands its capacity when it can mobilize resources as it chooses.  
Money, it will turn out, is an enormously effective mode of governing.   
A number of economists have modeled money in ways that confirm its fiscal 
value.  They suggest that money can be conceptualized as an asset or, more precisely, the 
claim to an asset, that holds value according to the utility people anticipate it will have in 
extinguishing a future tax obligation.   A government can spend by giving people 
currency that is, basically, a credit good for paying upcoming taxes (or tribute, as in our 
original example).  As long as the government convinces people that it will reliably tax in 
the notes it has spent – redeeming them, in effect -- the notes will hold value equal at 
least to their future expected value to pay the tax.
66   Comparing money to a financial 
                                                 
65 See, e.g., Mark S. Peacock, "Accounting for Money:  The Legal Presuppositions of 
Money and Accounting in Ancient Greece," Business History ([2013]): 283-84 
(describing specialized exchange between palace and merchants in early Mesopotamia).  
66 Note that the future expected value attributed to money would include a discount, if 
money is used only as a device to satisfy a future obligation.   See below for discussion.  
See infra TAN ___ (a few pages on).  More generally, see, e.g., Thomas J. Sargent, "The 
Ends Of Four Big Inflations," in Conference on Inflation (Washington, DC: National 
Bureau of Economic Research, 1981); Bruce D. Smith, "American Colonial Monetary 
Regimes:  The Failure of the Quantity Theory and Some Evidence of an Alternate View,"   31 
asset backed by a future revenue stream, the “asset-pricing” approach evokes in its name 
the importance of money’s material referent.
67  Post-Keynesian “functional finance” 
theories may be read to assert a very similar theory:  the government can expand the 
money supply in real terms by spending and taxing.
68 
But even more classic approaches, those arguing that money is always a medium 
and never an asset, generate the same insight.  According to these theories, money holds 
value insofar as demand for it as a medium remains constant relative to its nominal 
supply, all else equal (an assumption carried forward throughout).  When a government 
adds to the currency in circulation, money will lose value.  If, however, the government 
credibly commits to contracting the quantity of money in circulation, demand for money 
will rise as well as people anticipate its approaching scarcity, countering the effect of the 
expansion.
69  Just as the asset-pricing approach predicted that money would hold its 
                                                                                                                                               
Canadian Journal of Economics 18, no. 3 (1985); Charles W. Calomiris, "Institutional 
Failure, Monetary Scarcity, and the Depreciation of the Continental," Journal of 
Economic History 48, no. 1 (1988); Bruce D. Smith, "Money and Inflation in Colonial 
Massachusetts," in Quarterly Review (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis) (Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 2002).  A number of asset-pricing models were developed 
to explain the success of early American bills of credit.  Farley Grubb, the scholar with 
the widest knowledge about and range of data from the colonial era, models paper money 
as a zero-coupon bond.  Although he does not use the terminology of asset-pricing, his 
instrument holds value contingent on its future redemption.  See, e.g, Farley Grubb, "Is 
Paper Money Just Paper Money?  Experimentation and Local Variation in the Fiat 
Monies Issued by the Colonial Governments of British North America, 1690-1775," in 
NBER Working Papers (Washington, D.C.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 
2012); Grubb, "Specie Scarcity and Efficient Barter:  The Problem of Maintaining an 
Outside Money Supply in British Colonial America,".        
67 For this terminology, see Smith, "American Colonial Monetary Regimes," 533; 
Sargent, "The Ends Of Four Big Inflations," 5. 
68 See, e.g, Abba P. Lerner, "Functional Finance and the Federal Debt," in Selected 
Economic Writings of Abba Lerner (1943). 
69 That is because when individuals, confronted with an increase in the money supply, 
confidently anticipate that the supply will soon be reduced, they will build that 
assumption into their calculations of monetary value.  The increased money supply will 
be offset by an increase in demand produced as holders, assuming that prices will be 
dropping as money is withdrawn, decide to hold more money to benefit from the 
deflation that they predict.  See Scott Sumner, "Colonial Currency and the Quantity 
Theory of Money: A Critique of Smith's Interpretation," Journal of Economic History 53, 
no. 1 (1993);  see also Peter Bernholz, "Inflation, Monetary Regime and the Financial 
Asset Theory of Money," in Kyklos (Blackwell Publishing Limited, 1988).   32 
future expected value to pay the tax, classic approaches predict that money will hold 
value relative to “its expected value as a medium of exchange” given the quantity of 
money and the demand for it when the money is withdrawn.  Theorists in this tradition 
argue that people are considering the government’s “promise regarding the future path of 
the money stock,” along with the expected demand that promise produces when they 
calculate future expected value.
70  But the “promise” at issue is the commitment to tax (or 
take in the money by fees, tithes, or otherwise) made after the act of expansion by way of 
spending.  Consistent with this approach as well then, we could refer to money having a 
value fixed or entailed by the fiscal system.   
Second, money functions in ways that affect the opportunities of individuals along 
with those of a stakeholder.  Its identity as a token carrying real value is not limited to the 
person paid.  Once authorities at the center have agreed to take it back from anyone’s 
hand in payment of an in-kind quota, others will recognize it as a token valuable to 
themselves and to those around them.  For the first time in a society without money, there 
is a unit that represents material value relevant to everyone (or virtually everyone), given 
their common relationship to the stakeholder.   That opens up the possibility of new 
exchange:  people who owe the center regular tribute might rather deal with one of the 
soldiers or suppliers holding tokens.  They could trade goods to him and keep the token 
to satisfy their later obligation to the center.  Or people might trade for a token because 
they know they can use the token to make another trade; others will take the token if they 
want to use it to pay the center or for their own productive transactions.    
The tokens offer a singular quality in this otherwise illiquid world, the quality of 
cash.  They provide a measure of recognized value or unit of account, thus making prices 
possible.  They operate to transfer that value as a medium when they travel hand-to-hand.  
And they accomplish payment unconditionally:  because they entail value that the 
stakeholder as a third party recognizes, parties who are strangers can use them pay others 
and complete the transaction without further relations.  Between the time a token is 
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determined relative to a future contraction may mean that money at an earlier point 
travels at a discount.  See infra TAN __ (discussion a few pages on).   33 
issued and the time it is retired, then, the token furnishes interim services as cash to 
individuals.   
The premium that people attach to tokens – we might call it a “cash premium” in 
recognition of the services that cash provides -- is just as substantive as the fiscal value of 
tokens.  In order to see the materiality of the cash premium, we need only acknowledge 
that a person might choose to make a contribution early to the stakeholder in order to 
acquire a token because of the utility of the token.  In effect, the person will be advancing 
the time value of a contribution for the cash services of the token.  Normally, people will 
decline to provide work or goods before they are due.  Working up front for themselves 
instead of another allows them to make investments – planting seeds, for example – that 
will be productive later.   If, however, money offers services to people that are 
themselves productive, then some people will work for money before the tribute they owe 
is due.  In our example, making a contribution early for a token might allow a farmer to 
use to token to buy fertilizer, labor, or a different kind of seed not otherwise available to 
him.  Others might come to the same conclusion – they may sell goods or labor to the 
farmer before their contribution is due to the center because they want to use the token in 
the meantime.  (This is not to deny some stakeholders with enough power could force an 
early contribution.  It is just to assert that force is not the only reason that a system in 
which people advanced work or goods might work.)  
In fact, the cash premium that people attach to money means that they are often 
willing to buy money directly from a stakeholder, without waiting for that source to 
spend units into circulation.  Free minting, described below, provided one method by 
which governments sold individuals money for bullion during the medieval period.  Later 
government arranged other ways to provide money creation on demand, including selling 
people Exchequer bills or extending them money loans in public bills of credit.
71  Most 
famously, in the modern era, the government licenses commercial banks to act as agents 
authorized to multiply the sovereign unit of account.  Each method allows people to 
expand the number of units circulating beyond that produced by the fiscal activity of the 
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public lending via bills of credit, see Theodore Thayer, "The Land-Bank System in the 
American Colonies," The Journal of Economic History 13, no. 2 (1953).   34 
stakeholder or government at the center, supplementing the amount of money generated 
by public spending alone.  Each approach has also raised complex questions about how 
the supplementary money – money created to respond to people’s demand for cash 
services -- is tied to the sovereign unit of account established by public fiscal activity and 
supported by taxpayers.  To get far ahead of our history, that issue is one way to 
understand the tumultuous history of commercial banking and, most recently, the 
financial crisis of 2008.
72 
Again, a number of economic models confirm that cash provides services for 
which people will advance the time–value of resources.  Recall that asset-pricing models 
describe the fiscal value of money as its expected future value in extinguishing a tax 
obligation.  That logic explains why a token that offers tax exoneration holds real value.  
It also predicts, however, that people will discount that value:  a token that works to pay 
off an obligation due next year or five years from now is worth something less than the 
value of that obligation today.
73  That prediction is qualified by one circumstance:  if 
money is a productive asset – one that provides significant services – people will hold it 
without discounting it.
74   After all, they are getting a return from money in the form of 
the cash services it provides.  The classic models make the same prediction and include 
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the same qualification.
75  In other words, the discount we would expect if people value 
money only because of a future condition is washed out by the premium we would expect 
if people recognized as valuable its services as cash in the interim.
76  To the extent that is 
true, the value of money – and therefore prices across the economy – remain stable. 
Recognizing the cash premium attached to money makes sense of the empirical 
evidence collected on early America, a relatively simple monetary terrain with money 
made by tax anticipation and limited forms of circulating credit.   Legislatures there made 
stable money in a cash-poor environment when they spent “bills of credit” into 
circulation as long as they taxed in the bills reliably and settlers used them as money in 
the meantime.
77     
Mapping the fiscal value of money and its cash premium reveals that they share a 
structural relationship.   Money depends on a basic pact:  participants advance the time 
value of a resource owed to a stakeholder in return for that actor’s unique ability to create 
cash – a way to fix material value in a unit that can be used as a measure, a mode of 
unconditioned payment, and a medium.  There is much more to be explored here:  if 
money is thus engineered, we would expect that its value would change according to how 
much utility people anticipated it would have for paying taxes and how much value it 
                                                 
75 As above, these models assume that there will be inflation on the issue of additional 
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period implies that the asset will be worth the most at the beginning of the period, when 
its capacity to enable trade is at a peak.  As the period draws to a close, the premium 
fades because the asset is losing capacity to facilitate trades, which take time to find and 
arrange.  
77 Here, see sources cited at notes __ (all models above).   36 
would hold because of its cash quality.
78  The point for present purposes is that money is 
a material matter.  It entails resources represented by the obligation at stake, enhanced by 
cash services delivered because of its form.  Each of those aspects flows from 
interventions in the real world – the tribute or taxing regimes put in place by a 
community and the rules that instill negotiability.  The result, money, is far from neutral. 
“The market” that takes shape is, in turn, a function of a particular money.  In many 
ways, the history that follows is the story of how money and “the market” have changed 
dramatically over time.  
 Money’s working logic reveals another aspect of its materiality.  Producing 
money involves a deal over matters of real value:  people advance the time value of their 
own goods and labor in return for a stakeholder’s peculiar ability to create money.  The 
stakeholder’s gains are substantive – creating money “pays” in the ability of that agent to 
use the resources advanced in exchange for a token.  There is no sleight of hand.  The 
stakeholder is granting in return a capacity, also a matter of substantive value, that no 
individuals engaged in only bipolar exchange can create.  Neither can we categorize 
money as “neutral” in the sense that it is costless to produce or that its costs are spread 
without distributive effect.  Rather, the process allocates expenses and profits across 
many parties, including the tax-paying public, those buying money for its cash services, 
and the stakeholder – who can be a small ruler, a sovereign state, or an agent like a bank 
licensed to multiply the public unit of account.   The point here is that the terms of the 
                                                 
78 Issues raised by discounting turn on how people gauge the time of taxation relative to 
spending. Tokens that “expired” at a certain moment would invite discounting towards 
that moment.  Most communities using money roll issue and retirement dates and allow 
any token to be used for any obligation.  Those conditions reduce the discount that people 
attach to money.  See, e.g., Grubb, "Paper money,".  The same timing innovations reduce 
the swings in money’s value that would occur as people gauged the amount of time that 
its cash services would last (although in contrast to the value that flows from its fiscal 
utility, the value of money that flows from its cash services would diminish not rise 
towards the retirement point).  The size of the cash premium that people attach to money 
also depends on how much they value the cash services of money:  if there is plenty of 
cash circulating, people will not attach a cash premium to money if more is issued.  In 
that case, they will take money only at a discount, charging more for goods or services.  
Put another way, money will hold only its fiscal value and no cash premium.  According 
to the models of money under these conditions, it will gain value (prices will fall) over 
time as money is retired by being taxed in.  For these and other effects, see, e.g., ibid.; 
Calomiris, "Institutional Failure,".   37 
deal matter.  Money is a medium constructed publically with costs and profits that are 
material.  “Making money” has been a profoundly important and deeply contested project 
over English history – and in countless other communities.    
 
Contextualizing Money Creation 
That project takes us back to the history.  The English experience provided the 
stage for the alternative creation story; if that story captures the way money works, it 
should illuminate the drama we find.  The drama starts with money creation and extends 
to the market that money makes.   
Conditions in early Britain support the argument that money is fiscally engineered 
and produces cash services for individuals.   Recall that Roman authorities structured 
their highly monetized economy on a fiscal base.  Imperial spending sent Roman coin 
into circulation across the Empire; tax levies assured every user along the way that 
imperial units of account would remain in demand.  In fact, contracts in Roman law 
carried only money damages; officials recognized no other medium as a mode of 
payment.  At its height, the Roman code enforced the unit of account in purely “nominal” 
terms – the amount of silver in a coin mattered not at all relative to that coin’s unit value, 
decreed at the center.
79  That practice did not deter individuals from exchange.  
According to a number of scholars, the strength of Roman assumptions that money was 
defined by the official unit and the extent of the imperial economy moved together.
80    
The “catastrophe” that followed Rome’s withdrawal from Britain registered in the 
collapse of material exchange among inhabitants.  Indeed, according to Simon Esmonde-
Cleary, England was more completely devastated than other territories precisely because 
its economy was so intimately intertwined with the Roman fiscal machinery.
81  For the 
next two centuries, coin virtually ceased to function as money in Britain.
82  Despite a 
                                                 
79 “Nominalism,” as such a rule is traditionally known, implies that the practice is 
formalistic; to the contrary, the unit decreed is established by the center to pay off the tax 
obligation.  See infra, TAN __ [chapter 2]. 
80 See supra TAN __ [chapter 2]. 
81 Esmonde Cleary, Ending: 138-61.   
82 See supra TAN __ .  In fact, the traces of money use that remained may have depended 
on organized taxing-and-spending.  See Abdy, "After Patching," 84-86; cf Williams, 
"Coinage in Conversion-Period England," 159-60.    38 
heritage of moneyed exchange and residual coin, people lived of their own; we might 
imagine that when money arrived, they would attach a premium to the exchange it made 
possible.  At the same time, the services of cash take more to reproduce, apparently, than 
the memory and even the example of surviving units; as far as we know, no media of 
exchange came gradually to the fore.  According to scholars extrapolating from a scant 
record, political authority reached a low ebb; the territory was highly fragmented and 
rulers were weak.
83  
Reviewing the archaeological record, Chris Wickham argues that the initial 
“turning-point” in the “reconstruction of political power” in Anglo-Saxon lands occurred 
in the late 6
th century.  Burials showing off significant wealth appear and, in the 7
th 
century, settlements become slightly more structured.  Political organization was still 
simple but early in the century, small Anglo-Saxon kingdoms doubled in size and became 
more hierarchically organized.   Tribute owed to rulers remained varied and modest but 
was well-entrenched.  It included rent, dues, military service, and other forms of 
obligation.  Chris Loveluck finds evidence of richer economic activity including imported 
ceramics, tools, glass, and metal ware, along the coast in the end of the 7
th century; signs 
of productive exchange and importing increase in the early decades of the 8
th century, 
especially in the East Anglia, Kent, and Wessex.
84   
Locally made coins, gold shillings often called thrymsas, appear in the midst of 
those developments, sometime near beginning of 7
th century.
85  They may not, of course, 
have been the money first invented by Anglo-Saxon communities after the earlier 
                                                 
83 See, e.g., Wickham, The Early Middle Ages: 313-14, 20-25, 32-33; Carlo M. Cipolla, 
Money, Prices, and Civilization in the Mediterranean World, Fifth to Seventhteenth 
Century  (New York: Gordian Press, 1967); cf.  Naismith, Money and Power: 18-19; 
Metcalf, Thrymsas and Sceattas, 1: 12-13.  Wales and Ireland have different patterns of 
development, beyond the reach of this narrative.  See, e.g., Wickham, The Early Middle 
Ages: 351-54.  
84 Wickham, The Early Middle Ages: 315, 20-23, 40-42; Christopher Loveluck, "A High-
status Anglo-Saxon Settlement at Flixborough, Lincolnshire," Antiquities LXXII(1998): 
[158-60]; see also Williams, "Coinage in Conversion-Period England," 153-54 (noting 
emergence of Anglo-Saxon kingdoms amidst continuous trading across North Sea).   
85 Williams, "Coinage in Conversion-Period England," 157, 88.  “Thrymsas,” an Old 
English variant on the Roman coin tremissis, may be a label mistakenly adopted in the 
scholarship for the coin that contemporaries would have called shillings.  See Metcalf, 
Thrymsas and Sceattas, 1: 29 n.4.   39 
collapse.  The unit of account used by a community need not be coin.  If the material 
referent of money is an obligation owed and the enhancing attribute of money is its cash 
quality, paper can function as well as coin to provide money.  The Anglo-Saxon kings 
may have experimented with money made of wood, revitalized old Roman tokens, or 
tried other ways of recording credits, leaving no permanent record of a contemporary 
money.  Those media could have circulated among selective circles, elites for example, 
creating cultures that would later be lumped under “gift-exchange” because the “money” 
made did not fit our more monochromatic expectation about what “money” is.  In fact, 
the money’s working logic invites many variations that blur the overdrawn dichotomy 
between “money” and “gift” economies.
86    
Having said that, coin solves an important problem that bedevils many monetary 
initiatives.  To the extent that money circulates physically – and that property that has 
been essential in many worlds, including our own -- the tokens representing the unit of 
account must be both durable and difficult to imitate.  Otherwise, they will be either lost 
or multiplied without a stakeholder’s permission, disturbing the balance between outflow 
and inflow, supply and demand, tax credit and tax redemption that creates stable value.  
(While counterfeiting is the far more famous threat, note that the loss of tokens because 
of their fragility or decay would be just as destructive.)  One solution is a token made of 
material that is rare, imperishable, and takes skill to work.  Given such commodity 
content, a stakeholder need only control means of producing tokens and the system can 
function.
 87    In fact, a stakeholder with enough authority could impose the costs of 
production on those obligated to it:  the stakeholder need only ask for at least some of its 
                                                 
86 The idea of a “gift economy” strongly differentiated from a money economy is 
powerfully articulated by a series of authors.  See, e.g.., Polanyi, Great Transformation; 
P. Grierson, The Origins of Money  (London: Althone, 1977).  For an insightful argument 
that the polarity has been overdrawn, see Naismith, Money and Power: 259-67.  Chris 
Loveluck similarly points out the complexities that “exchange” might entail, although he 
identifies coin more narrowly with “profit-” or “market-” led transactions.  Loveluck, 
Dobney, and Barrett, "Trade and Exchange -- The Settlement and the Wider World," 124-
29. 
87 The argument developed here means that the unit of account is not an abstraction.  In 
money systems that employ commodity content, the unit of account takes a material 
shape; it is not an arithmetic formality.  For supporting evidence that the unit of account, 
in early coin systems, was identified with certain anchoring coins, see infra, note __ [note 
attached to discussion on unit of account, next section].   40 
tribute in tokens made from the commodity and available from centralized sources at a 
fee – the sources will issue commodity tokens in return for commodity supplied by 
individuals, less the fee taken in tokens. 
Coins – tokens made of precious metal – are the obvious example.  Objects made 
of silver or gold hold a place among the wealthy in many communities as ornaments, 
medallions, or fancy plate.  They may be offered in reward or recognition, a role that the 
stakeholder could institutionalize at the center.   Adding the requirement that elite 
members contribute at least some kinds of tribute in precious metal, refined and 
regularized by craftsmen directed by the king, would follow comfortably.  The system 
would then produce the coin required to pay some obligations in money.  In addition, the 
craftsmen could provide additional coin to those willing to buy it for their own purposes 
with bullion.  Made according to this logic, the political character of money is not at odds 
with its “commercial” use.  To the contrary, the money-making practice of the later 
Anglo-Saxon world looks very like this proto-type – money was a royal monopoly that 
supplied money for both public and private use.  Its antecedents in the 7
th century are 
unavoidably speculative – but the evidence is suggestive nonetheless.
88  
  Gold shillings appear throughout eastern and southern England early in the 
century.  Initially found mixed with Merovingian imports, they imitated those coins as 
well as Roman examples in design.  Gradually growing in proportion to foreign coin, 
they turn up across a region so broad to indicate that they were used for more than 
external trade.  Their numbers, small compared to those on the Continent, were 
nevertheless significant:  using die evidence, Gareth Williams estimates that there may 
have been tens of thousands extant at their peak.
89   
  Gold shillings played a varied set of roles.  Pierced, adorned with loops, or 
mounted, many clearly functioned as jewelry.   They may have been used as amulets and 
turn up in graves regularly.   They provided treasure for foreign trade, as well as high 
status items for gifts and displays of prestige.  On the more utilitarian side, they acted as 
                                                 
88 See infra TAN __ for discussion of later Anglo-Saxon minting. 
89 Williams, "Coinage in Conversion-Period England," 145-46, 53-54, 69-73, 85, 88; see 
also Richard Abdy and Gareth Williams, "A Catalogue of Hoards and Single Finds from 
the British Isles c . AD 410-675," in Coinage and History in the North Sea World, c. 500-
1250 (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2006), []; Gannon, Iconography: 10-12.     41 
standard-setting weights.
 90  Many coins carry Christian imagery; they appear during 
England’s conversion period and may have been considered important religious symbols.  
Motifs evocative of Roman authority are even more pervasive.  Throughout the medieval 
period, political officials and aspiring rulers sought to identify their administrations with 
Rome’s power and prestige. Indeed, Christian and Roman heritage were highly fused 
during this period.  Williams argues that the Church promoted notions of “Romanized 
Christian kingship,” including the issue of coins and the introduction of written law as 
signs of godly rule. 
91 
  Whether early gold coin circulated as money has been more contested, in part 
because early finds came to light in hoards or graves; those contexts suggest they had a 
ritual role or served to display status.
92   Moreover, gold coin would have been far too 
valuable to change hands in everyday exchange, nor are the surviving coins nearly 
numerous enough to suggest that reach.   On the other hand, more single coins have 
recently been unearthed along with multiples in productive sites, consistent with their use 
in exchange.   Coins found outside of burial sites are far less likely to have been made 
into jewelry.  Ornamental uses also decline over the 7
th century.
93  Many gold coins are 
highly standardized in content, an oddity if their aesthetics were of overriding 
importance.   After mid-century, “pale gold” debased coin appears and some evidence 
indicates a drop in metal content that was sudden and consistent.  While scholars disagree 
about whether gold coin traveled at face value, later communities would debase coin in 
times of metal scarcity to make it go further as a unit of account.
94        
                                                 
90 Williams, "Coinage in Conversion-Period England," 161-73, 87-88, 90; Metcalf, 
Thrymsas and Sceattas, 1: 37.  
91 Gannon, Iconography: 10-12; Williams, "Coinage in Conversion-Period England," 
186-88.  On the profound importance of religious and political imagery to early medieval 
authorities, see also Naismith, Money and Power: 39-41, 45-72. 
92 See, e.g., Philip Grierson, "The Purpose of the Sutton Hoo Coins," Antiquity 44(1970); 
see also Philip Grierson et al., Medieval European coinage: with a catalogue of the coins 
in the Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge  (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986). 159-64.  
93 See Abdy and Williams, "Hoards and Single Finds," ; Williams, "Coinage in 
Conversion-Period England," 169, 88-89.   
94 See Metcalf, Thrymsas and Sceattas, 1: 39-40, 42-43; Williams, "Coinage in 
Conversion-Period England," 172-73, 82 90.  Even under regimes enforcing nominal coin 
values, gold coin was often passed by weight, given its enormous value.    42 
The circumstances fit the stakeholder story neatly, although some scholars assert 
that private moneyers established shillings according to a Merogovian example.
95   
Anglo-Saxon rulers could have copied continental coin, perhaps even making the first 
issues for ceremonial or special use, or for foreign trade.  The exchange of coin as a sign 
of political loyalty or reward would follow easily, especially in cultures where tribute and 
gift-giving was varied but well-established.  In the late Roman empire, gifts of gold from 
aristocrats to the emperor on his succession had been “regularized” as a tax.
96  Similarly, 
gold coin in England could serve as a mode of tribute within certain circles or for 
particular purposes, depending on how it was institutionalized.  It would thus link kings 
and elites, and travel between elites to make larger transfers of wealth – nothing about the 
royal production of coin or its basis in a regime of obligation is at odds with the 
“commercial” use of coin, or its value in private exchange.  To the contrary, the public 
engineering of money structures it sufficiently to create demand by individuals.   
Royally directed production would explain the uniformity of the coins.
97  
Systemic debasement would fit with the model as well, carried out as rulers struggled to 
keep up a practice of coin’s use.  The signals that gold coin was closely associated with 
political authority – the Roman and Christian iconography characteristic of the coins -
make perfect sense under these conditions.  Gold coin would be an assertion made by 
increasingly ambitious rulers that had royal uses and symbolic importance, as well as 
practical value for individuals.
98  Suitably, fines stated in shillings appear in 
                                                 
95 Scholars have traditionally argued that coin use in Merogovian Gaul was privately 
engineered, although some scholars are skeptical of that conclusion.  Compare Grierson 
et al., Medieval Europeal Coinage: 158-59 and Naismith, Money and Power: 37-41, 142-
`45 with Metcalf, Thrymsas and Sceattas, 1: 24-25 and Williams, "Coinage in 
Conversion-Period England," .    
96 See Esmonde Cleary, Ending: 8-9. 
97 As Michael Metcalf points out, there were large issues of certain coin types.  Metcalf, 
Thrymsas and Sceattas, 1: 12. 
98 Wickham argues that such exchange as did occur in early Anglo-Saxon areas was 
embedded in political relationships.  Although he may not have money in mind, that 
character would comport with the anchor of money in political authority.  See Wickham, 
The Early Middle Ages: 808-10.   43 
Aethelberht’s law-code of 600; the usage identifies the king’s authority with the unit, 
whether or not people paid off penalties in other material.
99   
A similar dynamic, writ more broadly, accords with the great surge in silver 
coinage that followed.  “Sceattas,” or early silver pennies (“paeningas” or “denarii”) 
appear near the end of the 7
th century, just as gold coin fades and signs of richer 
economic activity increase.
100   These early coins are abundant; Rory Naismith speculates 
that sceattas may have been “the most plentiful currency” that medieval England had 
until the late 12
th century.
101  Exchange remained a largely elite activity in 8
th century 
England, one centered on domestic, even subregional, networks; foreign trade did not 
drive economy activity as much as “the ultimate motor . . . landed and fiscal demand.”
102   
Silver coin, still a high value for subsistence populations, would nevertheless reach many 
more transactions than gold by those somewhat better off and would have been within the 
reach of more communities to produce.
103  If gold coin traveled in too circumscribed a 
way to create much monetary currency, sceattas could penetrate further, both in exchange 
as a currency between rulers and those obligated to them.
104  
In fact, sceattas come with a great variety of imprints, a golden age for 
iconography on coins. To some scholars, that plethora and the fact that many coins bear 
moneyer’s names seems evidence that making money was a private industry.
105  The 
same evidence, however, suggests just as easily that many communities had started 
making coin.  As Michael Metcalf puts it, “one kingdom – one coinage,” explains the 
pattern in most of England.  Along the coast, he adds that “one wic – one coin” might be 
                                                 
99 See Williams, "Coinage in Conversion-Period England," 189; Wickham, The Early 
Middle Ages: 343. 
100 Naismith, Money and Power: 264. 
101 Ibid., 5..  As of 2010, more than 2,800 single coins had been found.  Ibid..   
102 Wickham, The Early Middle Ages: 818, 22-23. 
103 For the continued link between elite wealth and exchange, especially domestic trade, 
see ibid., 706-07, 822-24.. 
104 Rory Naismith contrasts Rome’s tax-driven money with the more varied drivers of 
early Anglo-Saxon coin.  A centrally anchored money can be fueled by many types of 
obligations, including fees, rents, dues, and tolls, as well as taxes.  See Naismith, Money 
and Power: 37-39. 
105 Ibid., 37-41.; Grierson et al., Medieval Europeal Coinage: 158-59.  The assmption 
draws on the traditional interpretation of Merovingian coinage in Gaul as privately 
produced.  See supra TAN __ .     44 
a better description, referring to the coast towns where exchange was particularly 
extensive.  But those towns too were within royal authority, as were moneyers.  Minting, 
Metcalf notes, took place in “kingdoms closely governed.”
 106  The large-scale production 
of some dies and of sceattas themselves supports that conclusion.
107  Much of the 
imagery on coins remains royal:  there are diademed busts, helmeted figures, and heraldic 
animals including lions and hawks.
108  Religious iconography continues important, a 
vocabulary essential to kingship in the period.
109   
In the second half of the 8
th century, a series of Anglo-Saxon kings made their 
authority over coinage unambiguous.   They struck their names and titles into coin, 
successfully set standards for weight and fineness, and supervised moneyers within their 
kingdoms; some successfully patrolled for foreign coin, requiring it to be reminted.
110  
Dues and required contributions became heavier throughout the period.  There is 
evidence that in-kind payment of rents began to be converted in part into cash payments 
during the 8
th century, a trend that would continue in later centuries, and the late 8
th 
century Mercian king, Offa, extended tribute obligations to virtually “everyone” in his 
territory.
111   
Coin use, first efflorescent when the early silver sceattas began circulating, 
bloomed again from the late 790s through the 830s, contemporaneous with the 
                                                 
106 Metcalf, Thrymsas and Sceattas, 1: 3, 12-13, 16-17, 22-24; see also Gannon, 
Iconography: 15-17.  For the greater exchange complexity in eastern England, see 
Wickham, The Early Middle Ages: 342, 809-10. 
107 Metcalf, Thrymsas and Sceattas, 1: 12. 
108 See Gannon, Iconography; Metcalf, Thrymsas and Sceattas, 1: 13-14. 
109 See Gannon, Iconography: 31-33, 185-91;  Naismith, Money and Power: 57-62.  
Ecclesiastical coinage probably also occurred at the sufferance of the king; bishops and 
other clerics had less political autonomy in England than across the channel.  See 
Wickham, The Early Middle Ages: 346; Metcalf, Thrymsas and Sceattas, 1: 14.  Having 
said that, the Church like other collectives had the structural position to create a medium.  
110 See Naismith, Money and Power: 96-112, 26, 28-40, 68-80, 293-95.  Offa was 
particularly effective on that score.  See ibid., 206-09.;  Metcalf, Thrymsas and Sceattas, 
1: 16-17.  Fifty percent of well-preserved coins from the period 757-865 weigh within .10 
gram of others from the same phase of minting, as judged by Naismith.  Naismith, Money 
and Power: 170.  Occasionally, the uniformity of coin did break down; Offa’s move to a 
heavier penny in about 792 or 793 occurred after an era of debasement and imposed a 
new order that was maintained for most of the 9
th century.  Ibid., 96, 101-06..  
111 Wickham, The Early Middle Ages: 349-51, 78; Naismith, Money and Power: 23-30, 
36, 277-80.   45 
strengthening of royal control over the coinage.  Single finds of coins minted between 
757 and 865 now number more than 1000.
112  Many such coins have come to light in the 
country, beyond the towns or sites that would have been home to merchants, clergy, and 
aristocrats, and are most common to the east and south.  Those were areas of more 
extensive domestic and foreign trade, although not the territories in which the early 
Anglo-Saxon kings spent most of their time.
 113  Native coins predominate increasingly 
over Carolingian imports but appear promiscuously across local boundaries; Rory 
Naismith suggests that English kings generally observed a monetary “entente cordiale” 
between themselves.  As he concludes, the patterns and “sheer volume” of coinage reveal 
“vibrant minting and monetary circulation” across the period, including middle- and 
long-distance travel.
114  Judging by evidence from the next century, these new pennies 
probably traveled at face value; coins of slightly different silver content turns up together 
as if all remained in circulation.
115    
The monetary reforms of these kings coincided with the further consolidation of 
English territory in the kingdoms of Mercia, East Anglia, Kent, Northumbria, and 
Wessex; Wickham calls the 8
th century an era of “political recomposition,” and notes the 
expanding ability of kings to mobilize resources.
116  The broad thin pennies issued from 
the end of the century on in the southern kingdoms would, with Carolingian pennies that 
may have been their model, become the norm for European coinage across the medieval 
                                                 
112Naismith, Money and Power: 209, 31-32.  There are over 1300 if foreign coins are 
included, and more than 4000 if the period is extended to back to pick up the early surge 
in silver sceattas.  Ibid., 199-202, 55..  Early silver sceattas had faded in use during 
during a period of debasement in the mid- 8
th century.  Ibid., 5-6, 96.. 
113 Ibid., 203-10, 29..  Northumbrian use of coin also flourished, although it remained 
more geographically restricted.  It was increasingly debased in the mid-9
th century, a 
pattern that may have allowed it effectively to reach smaller transactions.  See ibid., 210, 
47-48..  For more discussion of such dynamics, see infra TAN __ [chapters 3 and 4] 
114 Ibid., 209, 18, 52, 58, 78..  On agricultural development during the period, see also 
Loveluck, Dobney, and Barrett, "Trade and Exchange -- The Settlement and the Wider 
World," . 
115 Naismith, Money and Power: 165-66, 71; see also ibid., 157. (noting difficulty for lay 
users to judge metallic content). 
116 Wickham, The Early Middle Ages: 314, 44; see also Naismith, Money and Power: 6-
12.  Kent would be dominated by Mercia by the third quarter of the 8
th century.  Ibid., 
19..   46 
era.
117  The moment is a good one to consider exactly how each of money’s capacities 
connected people to political authority and how that connection configured the market.    
 
Making the Market 
The new narrative explains how each of the capacities associated with money – its 
function as a unit of account, mode of payment, and medium of exchange – is, at base, a 
mode of governing.   The unit of account, first, arises when a stakeholder takes something 
that is not fungible – the in-kind service owed by individuals or families -- and marks it 
with a token.   That measure is easily (and often explicitly) assumed in other accounts, 
given the difficulty of explaining how people engaged only in bipolar exchanges can 
create a term for value that is shared among them all. But the accomplishment, made 
intelligible once we admit the agency of a stakeholder common to them, is critical.  The 
capacity of an object to furnish homogeneous comparative terms – a unit of account -- to 
evaluate other objects supplies the terms for “counting” value, i.e., price. That unit is 
used both as the basis of accounting systems, and as the metric into which circulating 
coin or currency can be converted. 
In early medieval England, rulers chose to make the basic unit of account – the 
penny -- out of silver.
 118  That choice gave silver a price.  For example, a weighed pound 
of silver of specified fineness might be exchanged for 230 pennies at the mint – the “mint 
price” received when an individual took that amount of bullion in to be coined.  The mint 
made perhaps 242 pennies out of the bullion, kept 12 for the moneyer and the king, and 
                                                 
117 For the mutual influence between England and France, including the surprising 
evidence that Northumbrian reform may have pre-dated all the rest, see Naismith, Money 
and Power: 86-100. 
118 The accounting system may use different multiples than the coins in circulation.  It is 
not a free-floating metric, however.  It is instead anchored by the unit of account to an 
existing coinage or money.  That is, the unit of account is a term into which all modes of 
payment can be converted.  In response, groups in a community may strategize methods 
of accounting in order to escape from an official unit of account to another anchoring 
coin that they prefer.  For example, creditors in some medieval polities tried to keep 
accounts linked to a large coin that the government was unlikely to depreciate.  For an 
explanation of the unit of account as an anchor, as well as strategies to evade that anchor, 
see, e.g., Cipolla, Money, Prices, and Civilization: 51; Allen Evans, "Some Coinage 
Systems of the Fourteenth Century," Journal of Economic and Business History, no. 3 
(1931).   47 
returned the remainder.  The “price” of silver was tied, by definition, to the value of the 
tribute or tax obligation:  pennies made by the mint were the tokens used by the king to 
pay for resources advanced to him.  At the time the tax was due, each penny carried some 
part of the value that extinguishing the tax obligation held for people.
119  But without 
violence to that reality, observers could assume that coin expressed the value of the silver 
it contained:  at tax time, the arrangement itself identified the value that a penny held for 
extinguishing the fiscal obligation with the value of silver.  In fact, we might say that the 
silver coin had become a material proxy for the tax obligation.  (Money therefore also 
furnished a “store of value,” another function often attributed to money.)  It was not, 
however, the content of coin that gave it a priced value, but the system that made coin 
into money.     
Second, tokens clearly acted as a “mode of payment” to the government when 
they were returned in lieu of tribute or other obligation.  As we saw above, the tokens 
would invite use as a mode of payment in private deals as well.  Individuals could 
anticipate that everyone recognized their value, given the demand for them established by 
the stakeholder.  Perhaps even more importantly, a stakeholder would predictably support 
exchanges between individuals that occurred for money.   The stakeholder, now acting 
recognizably as a government, would enforce agreements made in those tokens because, 
in a very real sense, those agreements were its agreements.   The agreements opened 
arteries down which money could flow, channels that branched into smaller and smaller 
capillaries that took money to the edges of a community.   Insofar as a government wants 
to expand its own ability to mobilize resources with money, it will open and maintain 
those conduits -- the more official support for tokens, the greater their capacity to 
function.   
The Roman law’s directive that damages be stated in the official unit of account 
functioned to exactly this end.
120  The earliest records of English law are obscure, but the 
reach of authorities in courts and church counsels increased during the 8
th century, as they 
                                                 
119 If we imagine that a person’s annual quota of tribute was marked, when advanced for 
an early reward, with 230 pennies, then 230 pennies would exonerate him or her from the 
quota otherwise due at the time of reckoning.  (Such an amount would be absurdly high 
in early medieval England, but in an example it keeps the arithmetic easy.) 
120 See supra TAN __.   48 
became more involved in resolving disputes.
121  When the common law took shape in the 
12
th century, it adopted the approach taken by Roman law:  it required debt obligations to 
be settled in pennies defined as the unit of account.  In fact, the English common law in 
most instances excluded other modes of payment – including by weights of silver.
122   
Official support for monetary transactions – the judicial enforcement of the mode 
of payment – is also crucial in another aspect.  It is literally the place where a society 
determines what resources can be bought and sold -- and what resources cannot change 
hands for money.   That determination shapes a society.  The restrictions on sale of land 
in feudal orders, the slave-owning structures of the American South, the conditions under 
which waged labor can be hired are only the most obvious examples; we can add the 
debates that attach to selling children, political votes, sex, or kidneys.  Like the “price” 
provided by the unit of account, determining what constitutes a “commodity” that can be 
bought and sold for money is essential to the market.   
Finally, money’s engineering informs its activity as a medium, including the way 
that value comes to be hammered out on the market.   The center, as a creditor common 
to everyone, can ensure that the tokens are transferable between people by taking them 
back from anyone’s hand.  That latitude does not automatically attach to credit 
instruments.  On their own, IOUs are promises personal to the one who makes them and 
hold only as far as that person honors them, generally to an immediate acquaintance, with 
all the caveats and defenses that flow from that relationship.
123  At times, a group might 
accept the IOUs of each other, but the network extends no further than the relations of 
trust run between participants.  Credit that circulates more broadly depends, like money, 
on the enforcement power of a governing agent; it proliferated in England only in the 
early modern period. Until then, coin was the only medium endorsed as fully negotiable 
between strangers in England.
124  Money was, in other words, the original circulating 
credit.  It remains the only currency that travels without any conditionality:  insofar as 
authorities take back tokens indiscriminately (i.e., from the person to whom they spent 
                                                 
121  Wickham, The Early Middle Ages: 344. 
122 See infra TAN __ [ch 2, discussion of English nominalism]. 
123 Rogers, Law of Bills and Notes: []. 
124 See J. K. Horsefield, "The Beginnings of Paper Money in England," Journal of 
European Economic History 117, no. 32 (1977).   49 
the token or anyone else), those officials confirm that the tokens can operate successfully 
as a “medium of exchange.”    
That process creates a new interaction over material value within the community.  
Money can exist beside and between other norms of organization, within a subcircle close 
to the center, or across a wider circumference.  But money has an organizing effect on the 
people who use it.  A stakeholder likely spends money only on a certain kind resources – 
soldiers and military suppliers for example.  (The word “soldiers” comes, in fact, from 
the Roman “solidus,” the gold coin in which they were paid.)   The ability to mobilize 
resources selectively was, after all, the great advantage that spending narrowly (and 
taking more broadly) offered.  Entering the community through certain hands, money 
becomes available in corresponding ways; people who are close enough bid for it with 
the resources they have and according to what the endowed want; they pass it on in turn 
as others offer goods to them. Trades occur that could never happen before. But the 
results trace back to the spending priorities of the government, the way money flowed in, 
the resources each family held relative to what others wanted, and all the spoken and 
unspoken rules about who could deal with whom, what could be claimed and what could 
not be claimed, what could be traded and what was outside of trading.   
The process shakes the items traded into particular relationships of value. 
Eventually, those relationships produce prices for goods and other resources in terms of 
pennies, the units of account.  The pennies, as they are spent, traded, and taxed, 
ultimately create a set of equivalences:  5 pennies = a sword, 5 pennies = two cows.  But 
there is nothing essential about the sword and the cows and their equivalence.  To the 
contrary, they are interchangeable only in the world created by this community’s activity 
with tokens.  Only there, with a market that is a function of all the contingencies that 
contributed to it, is a sword = 5 pennies = two cows.  In fact, if the money and the way it 
is made evaporate, no one will give two cows for a sword, except by happenstance.  That 
is, there is no “real” equivalence between the sword and the cows “revealed” by money.   
A sword does not equate to the cows in value except through the intervention of the 
monetary engineering that made the token into a unit, mode of payment, and medium 
between a set of participants in the particular circumstances of that engineering.   50 
Indeed, once money circulates, it will reshape even the old relations of barter.  
Trades made without money will take place in the shadow of the moneyed economy; the 
tokens moving resources toward the center have redefined what each resource is worth 
between people.  Even trades made purely on credit – ongoing relations reciprocal 
enough to operate indefinitely without at token changing hands – will be rebalanced in 
the moneyed world. 
Money’s penetrating quality owes to a last characteristic, one that draws on its 
capacity as a unit of account, mode of payment, and medium of exchange all together.  
Once we have a working money, it can be expanded beyond its fiscal core.  In fact, 
English societies from the early medieval period through the modern era have engineered 
ways to supplement the amount of money created directly by the government’s spending 
and taxing.  If the money supply were limited to that publicly injected flow, it would be 
both spare and erratic.  That would be especially true in the early world, where 
sovereigns spent scantly for civil purposes but mobilized resources suddenly and steeply 
for military ends, withdrawing money afterwards.   The arrangement would leave 
unsatisfied a huge appetite for money in which to make deals.
125   By contrast, monetary 
systems can be structured to produce money to answer people’s demand for an 
instrument that provides cash services.  Once that engineering is in place, people can 
expand the money supply by their own action for their own use.  That capacity would 
explain the patterns of money found in 8
th century England, where royal authority over 
money increased but coin pooled with particular depth in areas of private exchange. 
The way the English supplemented money produced for the king’s use is clear by 
the 10
th century, and scholars have speculated that something similar dates to the 
beginning of England’s silver penny.
126  When English sovereigns established minting on 
                                                 
125 N. J. Mayhew, "Population, Money Supply, and the Velocity of Circulation in 
England, 1300-1700," Economic History Review 48, no. 2 (1995).  Another way to 
understand that “appetite” is as private demand for liquidity that would otherwise affect 
prices, driving them down.  When governments contrived ways to augment the money 
created by fiscal activity, they were responding to demand for liquidity by expanding the 
money stock rather than requiring deflation.  
126 Metcalf, Thrymsas and Sceattas, 1: 14-16.  Naismith appears to agree that the early 
Anglo-Saxon kings probably controlled the minting of sceattas and early pennies, at least   51 
demand (later called “free minting”), they set up a way to sell coin into circulation.  
Along the way, minting on demand also allowed the government to distribute to the 
population the cost of making tokens. 
The full story lies ahead, but the basic idea is that people could bring bullion to 
royal mints and receive coin in return.  The government made money by charging for the 
service.  As for individuals, they had to buy as much coin as necessary to cover their 
taxes.
127  At the same time, individuals could buy more coin when they wanted the cash 
quality it offered.  Their demand was registered in price:  when prices fell, coin was 
worth more and it was increasingly worthwhile to bring bullion to the mint.  Despite the 
fact that authorities took a cut of the silver brought in, the deal was profitable.  In the 
example above, the mint made 242 pennies from a pound of silver and returned 230 to 
the person who had come to the mint, keeping the remainder as the public charge.
128  
Although the individual received back less in terms of silver, he received it back in the 
form of coin.  Coin, as we have seen, was worth more than silver bullion insofar as coin 
carried cash value.  People would buy it as long as that was true. 
The technique tied the value of the tax obligation to the price of the commodity 
set by center in terms of tokens:  the tribute cost a certain amount of raw commodity or a 
bit less raw commodity in token form to satisfy.   (The tokens were normally worth more 
than the raw commodity, given the cash services they offered.  In effect, they furnished 
the “price” of the larger amount of raw commodity.)   An approach that identifies a unit 
of account with content priced in that way creates a channel for the expansion of money 
according to private demand.   It allows individuals who want the cash services of money 
to purchase units of account by putting up the raw material to make money, while 
protecting sovereign from any harm, since that limited commodity, once fashioned into 
money, is identified with money’s tax value.   People will do that so long as the resources 
                                                                                                                                               
to the extent of charging a flat fee or taking a proportion or moneyers’ profits depending 
on output.  See Naismith, Money and Power: 42-45. 
127 More precisely, in order to get the amount they needed, most people would trade 
resources with those individuals, mostly merchants, who bought coin from the mint with 
bullion.  That group had access to silver bullion and was likely the only group with the 
capacity to make finer calculation about silver content.   
128 For this proportion and others characteristic of the minting system in place after the 
12
th century, see infra TAN __ .  [chapter 2].   52 
they can command with that, new, money are worth the cost to them.  That will be true as 
long as prices in coin are low enough that those resources are worth more to them than 
the raw commodity, used for other purposes.   
The desire of people for coin in early Anglo-Saxon society did not turn on any 
comparison they made between prices in coin and a “world price” for silver.  Models of 
commodity money usually offer that anachronism as they imagine a reference point for 
coin’s value.  They begin with current prices in pennies (penny/good), and assume that 
people would know as well the amount of silver in a penny (ounces/penny).
129  That 
information (pennies/good given a certain number of ounces/penny) produces a 
hypothetical price in terms of ounces of silver/good.  Under those conditions, the price 
offered by a mint to make a coin becomes a matter that can be chosen by people who are 
comparing the alternative of using silver to buy goods.  They will take in their bullion to 
get coin when prices for goods in coin are less than prices for goods in ounces of 
silver.
130     
The structure of explanation invites the familiar intuition:  just as the world price 
in a commodity serves as a reference point in the explanation, it furnished a reference 
point in the creation of coin.  The possibility of comparison assumes, that is, the presence 
                                                 
129 A user would know the number of ounces of silver/penny if he or she knew the total 
number of pennies made from a pound of silver bullion.  Assuming the12-ounce 
commonly used in the early medieval period and a constant fineness, a penny would hold 
12 oz/ 242 pennies (the sum of the mint price and the mint charge, also known as the 
mint equivalent), or about .05 oz/penny.  In fact, it is not clear that the mints shared the 
mint equivalent with people.  See infra TAN ___.    
130 See, e.g,  Sargent and Velde, Big Problem of Small Change: 9-12, and TAN __ 
[discussion supra re ideal commodity money].  To continue the example above, if one 
penny bought more of a good than .05 ounces of silver (assumedly because everyone 
found it easier to use and therefore attributed a cash premium to coin), it would be 
advantageous to have coin rather than the same amount of silver in uncoined form.  More 
precisely, given that English medieval mints charged for their services, if prices for coin 
were sufficiently low that 230 pennies bought more than 12 ounces of silver, or one 
penny bought more than .052 oz of silver, people would go to the mint.  Once those 
pennies were minted, they would remain in circulation unless prices rose sufficiently that 
people would rather have the .05 oz of silver they contained.  At that point (leaving aside 
costs of melting), coin would be melted because, despite the sunk costs in producing it, 
people would rather have raw silver in it.  That is, the charge for minting created a small 
gap between the minting point (if prices are at or under, people mint) and the melting 
point (if prices are above, people melt).      53 
of a commodity already furnishing cash qualities to a community.  But that assumption 
conflicts with the dry conditions that existed by definition before money’s creation; it 
imagines the very capacity that it seeks to explain.   Nor does it pass a reality check.  As 
far as the histories of the pre-monetary English world indicate, there was no market for 
goods in terms of silver, “measured in ounces of silver per good.”
131  That is, there was 
no “price” in a medium of ounces of silver – certainly not for consumption goods.    The 
comparison between prices in coin and prices in raw silver for goods on the domestic 
market is an abstract deduction (given prices for goods in pennies and amount of silver 
per penny), paired with projection (prices in silver for goods).  It does not indicate that 
the items would actually be traded.  It cannot, therefore, do the equilibrating work 
assigned to it.
132   
Rather than holding value according to the modern imagination of commodity 
money, pennies offered a cash premium compared to the indigenous value of silver 
bullion.   Those coming to the mint knew how many coins were given in return for a 
pound of bullion. If prices were sufficiently low in coin that the quantity of coins 
received (i.e., the mint price) would be more useful than the raw bullion, people would 
come to have their bullion converted to coin.  That is, as long as coins carried the 
qualities that gave them purchasing power, people would buy them in preference to 
holding bullion.  Although it is less clear, people may also have known the “mint 
equivalent,” or the sum total of coins made from a pound of silver.  As above, that 
information gave them the silver bullion content of each penny.   If prices ever rose so 
much (i.e., coins lost so much of their value as cash) that people would rather have the 
                                                 
131 To the contrary, when medieval users concluded that their coin was worth more as 
silver than as coin, they would melt out (or otherwise find a way to value) the silver in 
coin and use that metal for purposes other than domestic exchange – most notably, 
export.  Note that the term “world price” has an ironic accuracy.  In fact, it was in foreign 
trade that coin – generally coin of high denomination – would be used at its intrinsic 
weight, i.e., in ounces of silver/good.  In addition, silver was often exported and recoined 
in countries where it could buy more by count.  Once coined, it would, of course, be 
acting also as money in that foreign world.  If silver were more highly valued there 
compared to in England, however, the exporter could make a profit by coining it and 
using it abroad.  See Redish, Bimetallism: 28-34.  
132 For more about how the medieval English government actually induced people to 
bring bullion to the mint, see infra TAN ___ [chapter 3].     54 
silver that was in them to use for other purposes, then people would begin to melt their 
coins.
133  In this sequence, we can understand why people bought coin in response to the 
cues that prices give them.  Moreover, bullion becomes a marker of value, one that was 
related to the amount of metal in coin but not one that previously conducted a shadow 
world of exchange or produced prices in silver. 
Selling people money for their own use benefited both the government and 
individuals.  It allowed the money supply to expand as people demanded more money, 
avoiding the painful deflation that would otherwise occur if people spread the use of 
money across more transactions.
134  In addition, when people had the option of buying 
coin, their decisions tended to maintain prices between a certain range.  People went to 
the mint as long as it was worth their while to get money (as long as coin had so much 
value because of its cash quality that, even given the charge for minting, it was worth 
more than silver bullion).  They would not continue going to the mint after that point.  
Indeed, if prices rose beyond the level at which coin held only the asset value of silver, 
people would melt or export coin, depressing the stock of money and sending prices 
down again.   Along the way, people paid the government its costs for minting, producing 
the coins that the government would collect when it taxed and spent in turn.  Allowing 
people to supplement the money supply, then, both tended to stabilize prices and paid for 
coin.  
We could put the logic another way, one that returns us to the creation story of 
money as a constructed medium.  Medieval minting tied money creation to a fiscal 
backbone, while allowing it to expand in response to the demand for cash.  When people 
bought money from the mint, they put up the material value in silver that was identified 
with the tax obligation.  That becomes clear when we consider that a stakeholder owed 
230 pennies would be willing to take, instead, a pound of silver – the material for making 
the coins due, plus the cost of minting.  People who bought extra coin were simply 
                                                 
133 The melting point would be a price at which people, given the number of coins 
required to buy a good, would rather have the silver for some other use. For more, see 
supra note __ .  
134 As a mode of redressing demand, deflation assumes a unit of account that is divisible, 
not a realistic condition in early monetary systems.  For the relationship between money 
stock and demand that would produce deflation, see infra TAN __ [footnote re equation 
of exchange].   55 
converting their silver into taxable form in order to use it along the way.  Their action, 
like the agency provided by the government, configured the market. 
  That brings us back in closing to look at money and the market defined by later 
Anglo-Saxon rulers.  We left the story during the late 8
th and early 9
th century period of 
political recomposition in England.   From the mid-9
th century on, that process was 
refracted through conflict with the Danes; West Saxons from King Alfred’s line would 
eventually consolidate control, expanding their authority over money as they did so.
135 
Edgar’s monetary reform, taken in 973, established a uniform currency across England; 
just as coinage on the Continent was fragmenting, the English put in place a system 
remarkable for its reach and sophistication.
136   
Reconstructing the patterns left behind, historians believe that the “renovatio 
monetae” was a system that very effectively created money and raised revenue.  The two 
were clearly linked; the late Anglo-Saxon monarchs imposed taxes, gelds, and other 
payments and required that those payments be made in coin acquired from mints they 
controlled.  Periodically, officials changed the type of coin that circulated; those owing 
public debts apparently had to pay in the new coin.
137  The requirement forced people to 
the mints on a regular basis.  On each occasion, sovereigns imposed a fee for minting.  
They also reaped revenue, conveniently in coined form, each time.
138   
That system allowed English officials to raise the geld that bought off Viking 
forces, as well as the revenue that went to more “domestic” uses.  The Anglo-Saxon 
Chronicles may well exaggerate how heavy the toll on English wealth was, but there is 
no doubt that thousands of coins went north to buy peace, as well as to mercenary 
                                                 
135 Ian Stewart, "The English and Norman Mints, c. 600-1158," in A New History of the 
Royal Mint, ed. C. E. Challis (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 13-
14; Naismith, Money and Power: 155, 233-34, 95. 
136 J. L. Bolton, Money in the Medieval English Economy:  973-1489  (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2012). 88-89.  
137 Ibid., 94.; Stewart, "English and Norman Mints," 59.  In 1178, the author of an 
Exchequer treatise, the Dialogus de Scaccario, remarked that people from certain 
counties had at times been allowed to pay their dues with coin of appropriate weight and 
fineness from any mint, since they had no moneyer of their own.  The comment suggests 
that individuals were usually obliged to pay with the coin of their local moneyer.  See 
generally Stewart, Challis, A New History of the Royal Mint: 55-59.   
138 See generally Bolton, Money in the Medieval English Economy: 87-99; Stewart, 
"English and Norman Mints," 55-56.   56 
troops.
139   Extractions continued at a heavy rate under the early Normans.
140  In rough 
correspondence, recoinages became more and more frequent over time; more than a 
decade passed before Edgar (959-975) renewed his money, while only a few years 
separated the coin types of later rulers.
141  Changing the design of coin made it easy to 
confirm that people had returned to the mint for new money.  Most of the hoards hidden 
on Anglo-Saxon territory in the late tenth and early 11
th centuries contain coins from only 
one minting; the remaining hoards include only a few pennies from an earlier type.  
Remintings must generally have wiped out all the coins of a previous series, reaching 
almost all of the money in circulation.
142  Individuals would have gone to the mints much 
less often, had they needed only to replace money because it was worn down or 
damaged.
143   For reasons that are not clear, coins also varied in weight:  the earliest coins 
                                                 
139  The hoard evidence from Scandanavia for the period 979 to 1035, some 60-70,000 
English pennies, dwarfs the coins recovered from English hoards from 973 to 1158, only 
about 52,000.  Bolton, Money in the Medieval English Economy: 61-62.    Early estimates 
emphasized that heavy taxation drew huge amounts of silver, earned from the wool 
industry, into the mints, an accomplishment that in turn brought Vikings as bees to 
honey.  See e.g., P. H. Sawyer, "The Wealth of England in the Eleventh Century," 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 15(1965): 160-64.  J. L. Bolton argues that 
taxation and production was lighter; the Vikings came not because England was so 
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Medieval English Economy: 91-92; see also M.K.  Lawson, "Danegeld and Heregeld 
Once More," Economic History Review 105(1990); J. B. Gillingham, "Chronicles and 
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140 Bolton 91-91.   
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Providence” images, and more than 20 different versions of a cross engraved with the 
letters CRUX.  Over 150 years, Anglo-Saxon and early Norman rulers changed the 
design of their coinage at least 53 times.  Stewart, in Challis, A New History of the Royal 
Mint: 49-55; Spufford, Money and its Use.  
142 Stewart, in Challis, A New History of the Royal Mint: 50-58; Spufford, Money and its 
Use: 94.  Bolton agrees that, at least through 1036, moneyers completely melted down 
their earlier pieces and produced a new and distinctive coin.  Bolton, Money in the 
Medieval English Economy: 94. 
143 Stewart in Challis, A New History of the Royal Mint: 55.  In a cache dating to the 15
th 
century when that criterion prevailed, a full quarter of the coins were more than a century 
old.  Spufford, Money and its Use: 93 n.2.   57 
of each type were heavier and got lighter over time.
144  Despite that difference, most 
scholars believe that late Anglo-Saxon coin traveled at face value.
145   The fiscal system 
was more than robust enough to ensure demand for the king’s coin and the proliferation 
of mints that facilitated recoinages would have made money accessible to those who 
wanted to buy it for their own use.
146  By the time of Edward the Confessor (1042-1066), 
a system much like the system of minting on demand described above licensed moneyers 
to produce coin after paying a fee to the sovereign.
147  
As the coin came in, the king levied a charge for minting.  Spufford estimates that 
royal profits amounted to 25% of the metal minted on each occasion, a rate suggesting 
strong centralized authority.
148   In turn, the tax revenue and profits reaped helped finance 
                                                 
144 Scholars have long debated whether the weight fluctuations were designed, through 
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Dolley and D. M. Metcalf, "The Reform of the English Coinage under Eadgar," in Anglo-
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three fold (from 25 to 70 mints) to blanket the English countryside south of York and east 
of Chester.  Their accessibility made the frequent recoinages possible, although larger 
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Economy: 94-95. 
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later shifted to a levy placed on boroughs.  See  Stewart, "English and Norman Mints," 
55-56, 58-59.  For the strong centralized control of the Anglo-Saxons, see Patrick 
Wormald, The Making of English Law:  King Alfred to the Twelfth Century, 2 vols., vol. 
1:  Legislation and its Limits (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2001); Nightingale, 
“King’s Profit,” 61-63, 70-71, in Nightingale, ed., 2007; Thomas N. Bisson, 
Conservation of coinage: monetary exploitation and its restraint in France, Catalonia, 
and Aragon (c.A.D.1000-c.1225)  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979). 6; Spufford, Money 
and its Use: 92-94; Stewart, "English and Norman Mints," 49, 68-69; see also James 
Campbell, "Observations on English Government from the Tenth to the Twelfth   58 
that rule. Officials supported by the indigenous money organized the space they 
controlled to allow trade, defense, and local order.   Mints were concentrated in urban 
spaces, associated with commercial activity but also administrative and military purposes.  
Markets grew up there and in the ecclesiastical or political centers sometimes called 
“productive sites,” developing as well if less profusely in the countryside to allow 
informal as well as informal exchange.
149  Their study would take us beyond the bounds 
of this history; it would, however, be closely connected to money. 
The law codes of the 9
th and 10
th centuries make the ambition of the early Anglo-
Saxon kings to control trades in money clear, as well as their responsibility for those 
trades.  Both – ambition and responsibility – were at play.  There is a tendency in modern 
commentary, even commentary on the early medieval period, to draw clear lines between 
commerce and political activity and to put money and moneyed exchange on the 
commercial side.
150   The stakeholder story reminds us, however, that public creation and 
use of money are profoundly important in the constitution of many communities.  For the 
late Anglo-Saxon rulers, a realm justly ordered was an elemental imperative.  That 
imperative included the safe-guarding of people and the policing of their relations.  Here 
gather the kings’ efforts, including by expenditure of silver coin, to consolidate and 
defend their realm.  Offa’s dyke, a military fortification in northwest England, may have 
been underwritten by royal pennies as well as impressed labor.  The military initiatives of 
later kings, their use of mercenary troops most obviously, surely were.
151  
The imperative of a justly ordered realm extended also to structuring private 
exchange:  the making of markets in money.   A provision in the law code of I Edward (c. 
900) established that  “no one shall buy [and sell] except in market towns.”  The Grately 
                                                                                                                                               
Century," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 25(1975)(suggesting roots of 
Anglo-Saxon centralized control in Carolignian influence).    
149 Naismith, Money and Power: 32-36, 131-32, 282; Loveluck, Dobney, and Barrett, 
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Code (c. 925-930) made it clear that large deals had to be transacted within the view of 
authorities, while a series of clauses subjected purchases involving cattle to intricate 
oversight.  Those, notes Elina Screen, were a “flashpoint” for dispute within a society 
that valued them so highly.  As she notes, the laws regarding money cohere “within an 
aspiration toward control both of people and property and the prevention of disputes.”
152 
The common law would soon articulate the rightful role of money, delineating the 
categories of its operation and defining its value as the sovereign coin of the realm.
153 
Anglo-Saxon law and its monetary order were, in other words, growing up 
together.  A code of V Ethelred from 1008 suggests the affinity contemporaries saw 
between law, money, public goods, and the market:  
And the promotion of public security and the improvement of the coinage in every 
part of the country, and the repairing of fortresses and of bridges throughout the 
country on every side, and also the duties of military service, shall always be 
diligently attended to, whenever the need arised, in accordance with the orders 
given.
154  
 
Another provision from the same sovereign tied money and the market to law even more 
simply. “Let us earnestly take thought for the promotion of public security and the 
improvement of the coinage,” it read.  “Public security shall be promoted in such a way 
as shall be best for the householder and worst for the thief.”
155   
That commitment promoted money as a means of exchange more broadly among 
lay people.  It prompted landowners who owed gelds to privilege the money that could 
pay them; by the 9
th century, rent was probably a significant use for coin in rural areas.
156  
That demand made money more valuable to their tenants; peasants as well as wealthier 
English began to hold pennies.  Larger mints in regular production along with smaller 
mints more sporadically active spread money across the countryside.  While liquidity 
remained low by modern standards, it seeped into the deals made by many more people 
in England and, for that matter, in Scandinavia.  Even when it was not present, it 
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154 V Aethelred, sec. 1 (1008), as reprinted in Appendix, Screen, "Law and 
Numismatics," 169. 
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furnished the terms of value and the measure for credit.  The Domesday Book, William 
I’s survey of England’s population and resources, “presents a picture of a society full of 
money, and money payments.”
157   
Reconsidering its creation story suggests that “making money” is a constitutional 
project.  In medieval England, silver and gold were the beginning, not the end of the 
story.  They furnished the material upon which the medieval world would act out a debate 
over how to package, pay, and circulate value.  That effort distributed resources.  It 
shaped nation building.  It brought England into competition with other sovereigns.  It 
configured new ways to represent counted value – public debt, circulating credit, and 
elaborate hierarchies of credit are all part of the story, as are markets, banks, securities, 
and financial crises.  The way the English made money shaped and reshaped the way 
people conceptualized it and the way they conducted monetary policy.  As a matter 
engineered on a fiscal frame, enhanced by the unique cash quality it offered, and 
expanded for a charge, money has never been neutral.  The story continues in the next 
chapter.   
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